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Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in
International Law
Timothy Meyer*

Scholars have long understood that the instability of power has ramifications for compliance with
international law. Scholars have not, however, focused on how states’ expectations about shifting power
affect the initial design of international agreements. In this paper, I integrate shifting power into an
analysis of the initial design of both the formal and substantive aspects of agreements. I argue that a state
expecting to become more powerful over time incurs an opportunity cost by agreeing to formal provisions that
raise the cost of exiting an agreement. Exit costs—which promote the stability of legal rules—have
distributional implications. Before joining an agreement, an “ascendant” state will therefore often require
either a greater share of the benefits from cooperation, or a reduction in exit costs through the use of formal
provisions such as withdrawal clauses, sunset clauses, and provisions affecting the legality of an agreement. I analyze how states determine which concessions to make in order to reach agreement with an
ascendant state. This analysis helps explain a number of puzzles in the international legal literature, such
as why states with poor compliance rates are sometimes observed to join international agreements at the
same or higher rates than states with good compliance rates; why weak agreements often evolve into more
constraining agreements; and why multilateral agreements are more likely to have low exit costs than
bilateral agreements.

INTRODUCTION
It is an inescapable fact of international relations that states rise and fall.
The eighteenth century was dominated by France, the nineteenth by Britain,
and the twentieth by the emergence of superpowers like Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States, only to see the demise of the first two.
Although only in its early years, the twenty-first century has witnessed the
ongoing consolidation of the European Union, the rise of China and India as
major economic powers, and the resurgence of Russia. Many of these
changes in national fortunes occurred over historically brief periods. Germany became a major world power in the first fifteen years of the last century, was defeated in World War I and remained relatively weak during
most of the 1920s, and then rearmed and reemerged as a major world power
in the 1930s, only to be defeated again in World War II. The Soviet Union
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to thank Karen Alter, Brian
Broughman, Bob Cooter, Dan Drezner, Mike Gilbert, Andrew Guzman, Larry Helfer, Ian Hurd, Mike
Meurer, Jide Nzelibe, Bob Powell, Cesare Romano, Alvaro Santos, Jeff Staton, and the participants in the
International Law/International Relations Roundtable at Vanderbilt University Law School and the International Organization/International Law Workshop at Northwestern University. All errors remain my
own.
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broke up in the early 1990s, but less than two decades later Russia is reasserting its regional authority and reviving historic east-west tensions.
These shifts in the international political landscape invite the question:
what effect do the rise and fall of nations have on international law? More
specifically, how do states bargain over the design of international agreements when they believe that they or their cooperative partners might become stronger (or weaker) down the road? Although power may be defined
in a variety of different ways, this question deals with a specific type of
power: the bargaining power that flows from being able to credibly threaten
to withhold one’s participation in an institution, such as an international
agreement.1 It is in this sense that I use the terms “power” and “bargaining
power” throughout this Article.2 The ability to credibly threaten not to
participate in an institution depends on one’s alternatives to cooperation. A
state only has a credible threat to withhold its participation if its payoff
from noncooperation—what I refer to as a state’s outside option—is greater
than its payoff from cooperation. Thus, a state’s bargaining power depends
on its outside option. As the value of a state’s outside option increases relative to the value of cooperation, so too does a state’s bargaining power.
In acting as international lawmakers, states must surely take into account
potential shifts in bargaining power. A state might, for example, delay making an agreement because it expects that it will be more powerful relative to
its potential cooperative partners later, and hence able to extract beneficial
concessions. Alternatively, a state might be willing to make concessions now
to avoid the possibility of bargaining from a weaker position in the future.
And, of course, if a state finds itself having become more powerful since it
entered into an agreement, it may seek to renegotiate or revise that agreement to reflect the new underlying power distribution.
Yet despite both their pervasiveness and importance to the stability of
international law, shifts in bargaining power have largely been omitted from
the legal scholarship on how states design international agreements. To be
sure, international relations scholars have long understood the importance of
shifts in power for conflicts between states,3 but until recently they had only

1. To some extent, this definition of “power” resembles the concept of “go-it-alone power” as set
forth by LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD: POWER POLITICS AND THE RISE OF SUPRANATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS 6–7 (2000). Like Gruber’s notion of “go-it-alone power,” states here have leverage to
renegotiate the terms of cooperation when they can make a credible threat to abandon the existing terms
of cooperation. However, the term “go-it-alone power” suggests that a state’s alternative to cooperation
is always noncooperation. As I explain later, I have a more expansive notion of what constitutes alternatives to cooperation that includes cooperating in other fora or with other partners.
2. This is, of course, not to deny that other conceptions of power may be appropriate for answering
other questions.
3. See, e.g., HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (1967); ROBERT POWELL, IN THE
SHADOW OF POWER: STATES AND STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999) (analyzing how power
configurations affect the probability of war).
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rarely ventured to apply those insights to the field of international law.4 For
their part, international legal scholars studying the design of international
agreements have focused their attention on describing the tradeoffs between
formal legal provisions—those that affect the credibility of a commitment—and substantive legal provisions—those obligations related directly
to the subject matter of an agreement.5 These scholars have not, however,
examined how states’ expectations about shifting bargaining power—and
thus their expectations about the possibility of renegotiation—affect the design of international agreements. And while legal scholars have by no means
turned a blind eye to power’s relationship to international law more generally, they have tended to focus on the ways in which power can shape observance of the law, rather than exploring the antecedent question of how
power shapes the law.6
The seeds of future actions are, however, sown in the soil of contemporary
behavior. One cannot understand why shifts in power cause states to abandon international rules to which they have previously agreed without first
understanding how states thought about the possibility of shifts in power
when creating those same rules. In short, one must integrate shifting power
into one’s theory of how states make law before one can fully comprehend
how shifting power affects states’ observance of law.
This Article evaluates how the fragility of power can affect the design of
international agreements, and specifically how it can affect the tradeoff between form and substance. In so doing, this Article adds to our understanding of how states bargain over the substantive and formal aspects of
international agreements and the creation of international law more generally. Recognizing wide variation in the types of formal provisions used in
international agreements—including escape clauses, withdrawal clauses,
sunset provisions, dispute resolution provisions, and provisions governing
the legality of an agreement—legal scholars have sought to explain what
motivates states to include particular provisions but not others. What has
emerged is a healthy literature that explains much of the variation we observe in international agreements. Risk and uncertainty manifest themselves
in different ways, and different types of provisions add value, or fail to when
one might expect they would, for different reasons. Moreover, by pairing
different formal provisions with different substantive commitments, states
are able to generate agreement and cooperation in areas where it might not
4. For examples of political science research exploring the design of international agreements, see
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421,
446–47 (2000); Barbara Koremenos, Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility,
55 INT’L ORG. 289 (2001).
5. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 579
(2005) [hereinafter Guzman, Design]; Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM.
J. INT’L L. 581 (2005).
6. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11–13
(2005).
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otherwise have been possible. At the end of the day though, states make
these tradeoffs between form and substance based on political and economic
realities that may not be the same from day to day or year to year. States’
expectations about how their political fortunes will change should, then,
play a major role in the design of international agreements.
The key to understanding how shifting power affects the tradeoff between
form and substance is recognizing that such shifts can allow a state to credibly threaten to exit an agreement. A credible threat to exit an international
agreement confers power on a state by allowing the state to demand a
greater share of the gains from cooperation in exchange for participating.
Drawing on this notion of credible threats to exit, I conceptualize bargaining power as the value of a state’s outside option—its next-best alternative
to the existing or proposed agreement. If a state’s outside option becomes
more valuable than the current agreement, a state can demand to renegotiate
the agreement in its favor. And if renegotiation is unsuccessful, the state can
withdraw from the agreement. Although it is perhaps counterintuitive, such
renegotiations and withdrawals can make other states worse off relative to
the status quo agreement and yet still be rational for all parties.7
Thus, when bargaining over the initial creation of an agreement states
must be cognizant of their expectations about how bargaining power may
shift in the future. In designing international agreements, states have some
control over the likelihood that a state will develop a credible threat to exit.
That is, within certain limits, states can mitigate the effects of shifting
power and therefore the likelihood of renegotiation. States have at their disposal a variety of different formal provisions that can raise or lower the cost
of exiting an agreement, including withdrawal provisions, sunset or duration provisions, and provisions affecting the legality of an agreement. Because a state must incur the costs of exiting an existing agreement to avail
itself of its outside option, raising exit costs reduces the likelihood of a state
later developing a credible threat to exit—and therefore reduces the likelihood of renegotiations that are not Pareto-improving.
As even the casual observer can tell, however, states routinely employ low
exit costs and thus raise the possibility of future redistributive amendments.
The possibility of non-Pareto-improving amendments is a puzzle, because
we would generally think states would want their agreements to be renegotiation-proof (or as close to renegotiation-proof as possible), both to avoid
the possibility of losing the gains tomorrow that they bargained for today
and to induce reliance on the promises exchanged. In this Article, I explore
how expected shifts in bargaining power can explain this oddity. A state
that expects to see its outside option improve tomorrow (an “ascendant
state”) incurs an opportunity cost by entering into an agreement today. Specifically, because it will have to pay the exit costs associated with the agree7. See GRUBER, supra note 1, at 38–40.
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ment to obtain its outside option in the future, the ascendant state reduces
its expected future leverage. The ascendant state will therefore demand a
greater share of the benefits from cooperation—it will, in other words, demand substantive rules that are more favorable. High exit costs therefore
narrow the set of substantive rules that make an agreement today worth
foregoing tomorrow’s bargaining power. In extreme situations, high exit
costs may preclude an agreement altogether.
Alternatively, the ascendant state may demand, or a “declining state”
may offer, low exit costs. These low exit costs allow the ascendant state to
retain the ability to renegotiate when it becomes more powerful. By allowing the ascendant state greater freedom to exit its obligations, the declining state may not have to make as many concessions on the substantive
rules in order to get an agreement.
Shifting bargaining power, in other words, creates incentives for both ascendant and declining states to concede on the issue of exit costs. Declining
states may actually wish to have low exit costs because they prefer a greater
share of the benefits from cooperation today, and conceding on the issue of
exit costs may allow them to extract preferable substantive rules. Low exit
costs also facilitate entrance by ascendant states, making more agreements
possible. In contrast, ascendant states may in some cases be willing to concede high exit costs, precisely because of the bargaining power it confers on
them in negotiating substantive rules.
The fact that states may capture expected shifts in power in either the
formal or substantive aspects of an agreement, and that in doing so they
often opt to reduce exit costs, complicates our understanding of how states
behave in authoring international law. My analysis shows first that in the
presence of shifting power, stable legal rules—those with high exit costs—
are not distributionally neutral.8 Intuitively, high exit costs favor declining
states by locking in the terms of cooperation despite future shifts in bargaining power. Perhaps less intuitively, stable and enduring international legal
rules will tend to substantively favor ascending states in a way that may
undermine their attractiveness. Put differently, all else equal, we would expect to see less stable and durable legal rules in the presence of shifting
bargaining power. Second, states with little to gain from existing rules are
“powerful” in the sense in which I use that term, precisely because their
outside options likely present them with credible threats to walk away from
existing rules of cooperation. This means that states on the outskirts of international cooperation—rogue states, or developing nations that have not
historically participated in the formation of international legal rules—will
have a disproportionate influence on the shape of legal rules when those
rules are important to broader efforts at cooperation.9 Third, states have an
8. See infra Part III.C.2.
9. See infra Part IV.
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incentive to undermine cooperation by investing in their outside options. A
state might, for example, develop alternative legal institutions or technological capabilities that make existing legal rules relatively less attractive to it.
A state that benefits from contributing to a public bad might withhold its
participation in schemes aimed at solving that public bad when its activities
that contribute to the public bad are on the rise. Consider a developing
nation that industrializes despite the negative effect of industrialization on
climate change: as a growing industrial economy becomes more important
to a state, limitations on industrial growth—such as those that might be
imposed as part of a climate change regime—become costlier for that state.
And as legal rules limiting industrial growth become costlier, a state is in a
position to withhold its participation if the rules are not favorable to it.
Improved outside options, in other words, may allow a state to negotiate or
renegotiate legal rules in its favor.10
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I briefly review the existing
literature on the design of international agreements and the tradeoff between
form and substance. Although this literature explains much of the variation
we observe, shifts in power—a commonplace occurrence in the real world—
are absent from discussions on form and substance. In Part II, I explore the
doctrinal and functional issues related to exit costs: what provisions affect
exit costs and how? I also discuss how, from the standpoint of inducing
renegotiation, the ability to exit an agreement differs from the ability to
violate an agreement. Part III develops the theory of how states will design
international agreements in light of changes in bargaining power. The theory shows that where power is shifting, states will often face a tradeoff between pursuing high exit costs, which reduce the likelihood of future
renegotiation, and pursuing favorable substantive rules. The paradoxical result is that states that expect to become weaker over time may sometimes
prefer an agreement that leaves them vulnerable to having to give up their
bargained-for gains, while states that expect to become more powerful will
be willing to give away their future bargaining leverage if they can obtain
sufficiently favorable substantive rules now.
Part IV explores the implications of this theory. I argue that the theory of
bargaining against the backdrop of expected shifts in power helps explain a
number of puzzles in international law, including why states with poor compliance rates sometimes join international agreements at higher rates than
states with good compliance rates, why weak agreements often evolve into
more constraining agreements, and why multilateral agreements are more
likely to have low exit costs than bilateral agreements. Part V concludes.

10. See infra Part IV.
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AGREEMENT DESIGN

Shifting power has been an omitted variable in certain parts of the international law literature. Scholars have, to be sure, paid heed to the relationship between power and law.11 But legal scholars have sometimes ignored
the instability of power. Moreover, legal scholarship that does incorporate
power has generally not distinguished between power’s effect on compliance
with international law and power’s effect on the creation of international law
itself, emphasizing the former over the latter.12 Yet one cannot understand
how states behave as subjects of international law without first understanding how they behave as creators of international law.
Over the past several years, scholars have begun to rise to this challenge,
putting forward a number of theories as to how international agreements are
designed. To varying degrees, these theories shed light on how states attempt to cope with uncertainty generally and the likelihood or desirability
of future renegotiations. This section discusses and evaluates some of these
existing theories.
A. Form and Substance
Before discussing theories, it is useful to clarify terminology. Scholars
working on the design of international agreements generally agree that different “design elements” or “dimensions”13 of international agreements interact with each other to produce the wide variation we see in international
agreements. More specifically, scholars have generally found it useful to categorize provisions of international agreements as relating to matters of
“form” or matters of “substance.”14 Broadly speaking, “substance” refers to
those obligations directly related to the subject matter of an agreement. For
example, in an agreement governing trade in nuclear technology, an obligation not to sell specific types of nuclear materials or equipment to states that
have not accepted international safeguards is a substantive commitment.15
Substantive commitments can be viewed through a variety of lenses. Many
scholars studying the form-substance tradeoff focus their analysis of substance on the depth of cooperation, or the extent to which an agreement’s
11. The effects of power—but not shifts in power—on international law generally have, of course,
been a subject of great discussion in international law for decades. These discussions have generally drawn
on the study of international institutions by political scientists and scholars of international relations. See,
e.g., Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 64
(2006).
12. Notable studies that do deal with the creation and evolution of international agreements include
GRUBER, supra note 1; Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining
and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339 (2002).
13. Raustiala, supra note 5, at 583.
14. See generally id.; Guzman, Design, supra note 5.
15. Timothy Meyer, Soft Law as Delegation, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 888, 926 (2009) (discussing the
safeguard requirements for the transfer of certain nuclear technology) [hereinafter Meyer, Delegation].
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obligations require deviation from status quo behavior.16 I focus below on
the distributional implications of substantive commitments and ask a particular question: are the subject-matter specific obligations contained in an
agreement more favorable to one state or another?
“Form” refers to those aspects of an agreement that relate to the credibility of the substantive obligations created, or which prescribe procedures for
monitoring compliance and shaping the content of the substantive obligations. So, for example, the decision whether to include dispute resolution
provisions is a matter of form. Tribunals provide both monitoring functions
and expositional functions; that is, tribunals create information about
whether a state is complying with its obligations, and they also clarify the
content of those obligations.17 But the obligation to submit to a tribunal’s
jurisdiction is not a substantive one; it is separate and apart from the subject-matter of the agreement. Provisions of an agreement affecting exit costs,
such as sunset provisions, withdrawal provisions, and legality are classic examples of an agreement’s formal aspects.
The categories of form and substance are useful because they allow scholars to think about how states trade off different design elements in creating
international agreements. If, for example, an agreement is to include invasive monitoring procedures which increase the risk of violations being detected, states might wish to reduce the risk of violation by making their
substantive obligations easier to comply with.18 Another area in which the
tradeoff between form and substance is obvious is in the difference between
hard law, or legally binding obligations, and soft law, or non-binding obligations that nevertheless have legal consequences. All else equal, a violation
of a hard obligation carries with it a larger reputational sanction for noncompliance than violation of a soft law obligation. The reason for this increased sanction is that agreeing to make an obligation hard law is a more
serious signal about a state’s intention to comply with the obligation.19 If a
state sends a signal about its intention to comply and then fails to follow
through, its reputation for compliance will suffer, hurting its ability to extract concessions in future negotiations.20 States may therefore wish to control their risk of sanctions by making hard law obligations easier to comply
with than soft law obligations. Consider, for example, export controls on
nuclear materials. Article III of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(“NPT”) provides that states may only transfer nuclear equipment or material that can be used to produce or process fissionable material if the transfer
16. Guzman, Design, supra note 5, at 602–03; Raustiala, supra note 5, at 584.
17. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, Customary International Law in the 21st Century, in
PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 214–15 (Rebecca Bratspies & Russell Miller eds., 2008).
18. Guzman, Design, supra note 5, at 603.
19. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript at 20–21), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1353444 [hereinafter Guzman &
Meyer, International Soft Law].
20. Id.
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occurs under safeguards.21 The exact types of technology or equipment that
trigger Article III’s obligations and the safeguard measures necessary when
transferring such technology are, however, nowhere specified in the NPT.
Instead, soft law rules such as those produced by the Zangger Committee or
the Nuclear Suppliers Group are the source of regulations governing precisely what technology may be transferred and how.22
B. Uncertainty and Risk
Having clarified terms, the first group of theories worth mentioning is
that based on uncertainty and risk. Following the form-substance distinction, this group of theories deals directly with the question of how states, in
bargaining over international agreements, trade off the substantive provisions of an agreement (distributional concerns) and the formal aspects of
agreements that are designed to control uncertainty and risk. These theories
approach that general question from a variety of angles. Some studies have
hypothesized that where states are uncertain about whether conditions affecting the size or distribution of the cooperative benefits created by an
agreement may change, they may actually wish to mandate future negotiations, rather than try to avoid them.23 Planned renegotiation, such as may be
provided by sunset provisions24 or framework conventions that mandate negotiations on future protocols,25 address this type of uncertainty by forcing
states back to the drawing board to consider changed or evolved
circumstances.
This view makes sense when applied to situations in which power is expected to be relatively stable. If bargaining power is expected to remain
roughly the same over time, planned renegotiation provides states with a
mechanism to deal with uncertainty or unforeseen changes in conditions.26
But the explanatory power of uncertainty can be overstated. In particular,
this account makes considerably less sense in situations in which states expect power to shift over time.
Changing conditions can, to be sure, result in shifts in the distribution of
benefits under an international agreement. For example, the strong intellectual property protections contained in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (“TRIPS”) have had the effect of raising
21. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. III, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
22. Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15, at 924–25.
23. See JOSEPH GRIECO, COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS: EUROPE, AMERICA, AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE 228 (1990) (“If two states are worried or uncertain about relative achievement of gains,
each will prefer a less durable cooperative arrangement, for each will want to more readily be able to exit
from the arrangement in the event that gaps in gains favor the other.”); Koremenos, supra note 4, at
291–92.
24. Koremenos, supra note 4, at 309.
25. John K. Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 193, 213 (1999).
26. Koremenos, supra note 4, at 292–93.
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the cost of medicine above what developing countries can pay to fight the
HIV/AIDS epidemic those countries face.27 As a result of pressure by developing nations, TRIPS was effectively amended in 2001, through the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, to give the least
developed WTO members an additional ten years before they must protect
pharmaceuticals.28
However, the fact that conditions may change and disrupt the anticipated
benefits of the existing agreement does not mean that states will be willing
or able to negotiate a return to the initial distribution of benefits, as planned
renegotiation assumes they would. If bargaining power shifts between the
initial negotiation and a renegotiation, one would expect the outcome of
renegotiation to reflect the new underlying distribution of power. Thus, at
the initial negotiation of an agreement, one would predict that states expecting to lose bargaining power in the future should be opposed to mandating
renegotiation through sunset provisions or framework agreements.29 Such
provisions, by dissolving the existing agreement just as some state or group
of states is getting stronger, confers bargaining power on those rising states.
Planned renegotiation should only emerge in areas in which major shifts in
bargaining power are not expected, or where uncertainty about an agreement’s implementation is so severe that it swamps concerns about shifting
power.
A second theory based on uncertainty holds that because states cannot
write perfectly enforceable contracts, they will balance the marginal expected costs associated with steeper penalties for undeterred violations
against the benefits from deterred violations.30 Because international law
lacks a system of compensatory damages, sanctions assessed against a violating state are a net loss to the parties.31 While not specifically concerned with
renegotiation, this approach sheds some light on how states may think about
controlling the likelihood of renegotiation.32 Like exit, violations or the
threat thereof can be used to withhold cooperative behavior and thereby
inflict costs on one’s cooperative partners. Public violations are thus a bit
like temporary (and illegal) exits; they can be used to spur renegotiation.33

27. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L. L. 1, 5 (2004) [hereinafter Helfer, Regime Shifting].
28. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001 on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health, ¶ 7, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
29. For high levels of uncertainty about an agreement’s effects, states might still prefer renegotiation
in the presence of shifting power. Shifting power, however, reduces the appeal of renegotiation. Koremenos, supra note 4, at 296 n.26.
30. Guzman & Meyer, International Soft Law, supra note 19, at 23; cf. Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing
Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human
Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002) [hereinafter Helfer, Overlegalizing].
31. Guzman & Meyer, International Soft Law, supra note 19, at 20.
32. Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15.
33. Id.
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Just as raising exit costs reduces the threat of renegotiation, so too does
raising the sanctions associated with violation.
Perhaps the theories with which this Article has the most in common are
those that argue that states may use withdrawal clauses or escape clauses as a
form of insurance.34 Such insurance, while suboptimal from an ex post standpoint, can be optimal from an ex ante standpoint because it helps to facilitate
agreement where agreement might not otherwise have been possible. Withdrawal and escape clauses facilitate entrance at the expense of also facilitating
exit. These studies thus highlight the relationship between form and agreement membership over the life of an agreement. In some situations, broad
membership at an agreement’s conception can come with an increased likelihood of declining membership over time.35 Moreover, these studies have
provided preliminary empirical support for the idea that the legal right to
exit is meaningful to states. Helfer has shown that treaty denunciation, conventionally understood to be an aberration, is relatively commonplace, if not
frequent.36 He finds 1,547 treaty denunciations between 1945 and 2004, or
roughly one denunciation for every twenty-one ratifications during that period.37 This figure, although seemingly small, highlights the importance of
exit as an empirical phenomenon, particularly when one considers that a) we
should only observe an exit when the threat of exit has failed to spur renegotiation;38 and b) Helfer’s figure includes only denunciations and withdrawals
from hard law agreements, but not exits from soft law agreements or exits
that occur through other mechanisms, such as a failure to renew an
agreement.39
Like those theories that explicitly contemplate renegotiation, however,
these latter theories generally do not take into account bargaining power, let
alone changes in bargaining power. Moreover, while these theories offer valuable insights into how an individual agreement is designed, they do not
offer a window into how the next agreement is designed or how renegotiation occurs. In short, they do not sufficiently explain the evolution of international law. An analysis of shifting power, renegotiation, and provisions
affecting exit costs more broadly—including not only withdrawal provisions
34. Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1599–1601 (2005) [hereinafter Helfer,
Exiting Treaties]; Alan O. Sykes, Protection as a ‘Safeguard’: A Positive Analysis of the GATT ‘Escape Clause’
with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 279 (1991).
35. Indeed, some treaties explicitly contemplate declines in membership that may render their continuation in force impractical. See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Unification of Road Signals art. 15, Mar.
30, 1931, 150 L.N.T.S. 247 (stating that the treaty will terminate if and when fewer than five states
remain as parties).
36. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1601–02.
37. Id. at 1604.
38. See infra Part III.
39. Aggregate data on soft law agreements are extraordinarily difficult to obtain or develop. Unlike
hard law agreements, which are generally reported to the United Nations or tracked at the national level
through mechanisms such as the Case Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112(b)(a) (2004), soft law agreements are not
subject to any centralized reporting system.
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but also sunset provisions and provisions affecting legality—offers a dynamic theory of international law that current theories do not.
C. Institutionalism and Neorealism
Other studies of the design of international institutions more explicitly
take into account the role of bargaining power but do so at the expense of
legal nuance. Political scientists working in the institutionalist tradition, for
example, have explored how the power to exclude parties from cooperation
can shape the cooperative regime that ultimately emerges.40 The essential
idea here is that groups of like-minded states can form “enacting coalitions.”41 Rather than compromise on the terms of cooperation with those
outside the coalition, the coalition is willing and able to “go it alone” if
other states do not adopt rules preferred by the enacting coalition.42 By excluding or threatening to exclude other cooperation-minded states, the enacting coalition can ensure that cooperation is on terms at least as good as
those it could get by “going it alone.”43 These studies are foundational,
highlighting the relationship between credible threats to “go it alone” and
the shaping over time of substantive rules of cooperation. Like much of the
political science literature on international institutions, though, law is
largely omitted from these studies. Instead, these studies focus almost entirely on the substantive terms of cooperation, while neglecting the formal
aspects of international institutions that can shape substantive outcomes.
Other scholars have posited a sharp tension between power and the rule of
law. Powerful states are sometimes assumed to prefer “shallow” agreements,
or agreements that require less of a deviation from status quo behavior.44 On
this view, powerful states resist paying the costs of changing their behavior
because they can—in effect, being powerful means being exempt from the
costs of cooperation. A similar hypothesis comes from the neorealist view
that international institutions simply reflect the underlying distribution of
power.45 It has been argued that powerful states exploit their bargaining
power in the design of international agreements to ensure that voting rules
allow them to control substantive outcomes.46 On this view, the formal aspects of international agreements fail to deter renegotiation because the
40. See George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism, 52 INT’L ORG. 397 (1998); GRUBER, supra note 1, at 38–40.
41. GRUBER, supra note 1, at 6–7.
42. Id. at 7.
43. Id. at 38–41.
44. See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 5, at 604 (“States with veto power may demand a shallow agreement
or side payments to cooperate (or both).”).
45. As Steinberg and Zasloff point out, this view has sometimes been attributed to all realists. It is
more accurately attributed to neo- or structural realists only. See Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 11, at
74–75.
46. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 13 (“[U]nder our theory, international law does
not pull states toward compliance contrary to their interests . . . . ”); see generally STEPHEN KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999); MORGENTHAU, supra note 3; Stephen Krasner, Structural
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powerful ensure that the formal aspects of international agreements simply
enshrine their bargaining power. This approach thus recognizes the distinction between formal and substantive provisions, while at the same time
maintaining that power relationships render the former generally obsolete.
Neither of these accounts fully explains the relationship between power,
form, and substance. With respect to the first, the fact that the powerful
sometimes resist cooperation is self-evident; that the effect of power on bargaining is a one-way ratchet toward shallower cooperation is far from obvious. An individual state’s net benefit from participating in an international
agreement can be thought of as the sum of the benefits it receives from each
complying member state’s behavior, less its own individual costs of complying.47 Formally, this expression can be written as:
Uj = (Snbi,i≠j)+ (bj–cj).
The first term represents the sum of the benefits the jth state receives from
every other state’s compliance (where bi is the benefit to the jth state of the
ith state’s decision to comply) and the second term represents the benefits
less the costs to the jth state of its own decision to comply.48 Regardless of
power, we would expect individual states negotiating an international agreement to attempt to maximize this formula. In other words, we would expect
states acting strategically to advocate rules that maximize the net benefits
they individually receive. The assumption that powerful states prefer shallow cooperation is really an assumption that states seek to minimize cj. But
an individual state should be willing to increase the marginal cost it pays to
comply with an obligation—the marginal depth of its cooperation—up to
the point at which that marginal cost equals the marginal benefit it receives
from a marginal increase in the cumulative compliance of all states. In terms
of the formula above, if an increase in cj is accompanied by an equal or
greater increase in (Snbi, i≠ j) + bj then state j should be willing to agree to an
increase in the depth of cooperation.
Thus, whether powerful states want shallow cooperation should depend
on how an obligation that increases their marginal costs of complying translates into marginal benefits. Depending on circumstances, a powerful state
might prefer to dictate deep cooperation. The legal regime governing ozonedepletion is a good example. Although the good produced—a reduction in
chlorofluorocarbons and halon that deplete the ozone layer—is a public
good (and thus the benefits of cooperation were not internalized fully by the
Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen Krasner ed., 1983).
47. SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATYMAKING 202 (2003). Put differently, the second term is the net benefit a state gets from acting unilaterally, while the first term is the benefit a state gets from the actions of other states. So, for example, in an
arms control agreement, the second term would capture those benefits the jth state receives simply from
reducing its own arms: costs savings, reduced risk of accidents, etc. The first term would capture the
bulk of the security gains which result from the other state’s reductions in arms.
48. Id.
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parties paying the costs of compliance), the costs of even deep cooperation
were sufficiently low in proportion to the overall benefits that leading states
such as the United States preferred deep cooperation.49
The neorealist view, for its part, overstates its case. Even supposing for
the sake of argument that states that are powerful at the moment of negotiation are able to dictate freely those formal provisions of an agreement that
allocate future bargaining power among the parties, the assumption that
they would always prefer rules that translate contemporary bargaining
power into outcomes overlooks the same real world phenomenon as those
hypotheses relying on uncertainty and risk: shifts in power. Because low exit
costs privilege states with attractive alternatives to cooperation—by allowing them to exploit a credible threat to exit in order to demand favorable
amendments—increases in the value of any state’s outside option can reallocate bargaining power. In other words, writing into an agreement formal
provisions that make control of substantive rules depend on exogenous shifts
in bargaining power is not likely to be favored by those using an agreement
to capture the benefits of transitory bargaining power.50 Therefore, as with
the uncertainty-risk hypotheses, we would only expect the powerful to dictate the procedural rules neorealists predict in situations in which they expect power to be stable over time.
The puzzle presented by the relationship between form, substance, and
shifting power thus remains. Existing theories of agreement design have
greatly expanded our understanding of how states approach the tradeoff between form and substance, as well as how power can affect the substantive
terms states negotiate. But no theory has yet integrated shifting power into
a theory of how states design international law. Absent such a theory, we
cannot understand how states use both the formal and substantive aspects of
an agreement to shape the ways in which international law evolves over
time. Simply put, we do not know why states leave their agreements vulnerable to redistributive renegotiation forced by states that have become more
powerful.

49. Setear, supra note 25, at 196. This was in part because there were low-cost alternatives available,
and also because a few countries contributed disproportionately to the emissions of chlorofluorocarbons
and halon, thus reducing fears about cheating. Id.
50. Of course, formal provisions that allocate bargaining power through the prescription of decision
rules will often not be as directly vulnerable to exogenous shifts in power. For example, if an agreement
gives a specific state a veto, as the U.N. Charter gives the five permanent members of the Security
Council, shifts in power may not as directly reallocate bargaining power within the agreement. With
such an arrangement, however, the danger is that if de facto power does not translate into some measure
of de jure bargaining power, disenfranchised powerful states will undermine the agreement’s effectiveness
by, for example, establishing a rival agreement or engaging in forum shopping. Kal Raustiala & David
G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L ORG. 277, 279–80 (2004).
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EXIT COSTS

Facilitating exit from international agreements leads to renegotiations if
power shifts among the parties. These renegotiations can make states worse
off than under the status quo agreement. Yet states nevertheless routinely
employ provisions in agreements that reduce exit costs and thereby make
renegotiation more likely. This Part defines exit costs and describes the different types of provisions that affect the cost of exiting an international
agreement. It also explains why exit is distinct from violation in terms of the
ability to drive a renegotiation.
A. What Are Exit Costs?
States are, in a practical sense, always free to exit an agreement,51 so
before analyzing exit one first needs a theory of what makes some exits more
costly than others. What are exit costs and what is the mechanism through
which they are imposed?
Exit is, in essence, a legal right. No state is obliged to enter an agreement
in the first place, and so as an initial matter all states have the right to
control the legal obligations that bind them.52 But like most legal rights,
the right to exit is neither absolute nor mandatory. It can be given away or
circumscribed upon entering an agreement. Indeed, the default rule of international law, as codified in Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (“VCLT”), is that an agreement that is silent on the right to
withdraw generally does not contain such a right.53
As discussed below, there are a variety of different provisions that affect a
state’s legal ability to exit an agreement. These provisions detail circumstances under which exit is lawful, restrict or make conditional the right to
exit, or impose potentially costly bargaining procedures on would-be exiters.
The obligation to refrain from exiting an agreement except in accordance
with these terms, conditions, and procedures is a legal obligation, and there51. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403, 2412 (1991) (noting that
“[i]t takes no particular insight to suggest that should a Member State consider withdrawing from the
[European Coal and Steel] Community, the legal argument will not be the critical or determining
consideration”).
52. See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters—Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the
Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 137, 138 (2005).
53. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 56, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
VCLT].
1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide
for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless:
(a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or
withdrawal; or
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.
2. A party shall give not less than twelve months’ notice of its intention to denounce or
withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1.
Id.
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fore compliance with that obligation is subject to the same mechanisms that
impose costs for violations of international law generally. These mechanisms
are reciprocity, retaliation, and reputation.54 Reciprocity is not really available to sanction unauthorized exit. Unlike a violation, a state would expect
that if it publicly exits an agreement the remaining parties would withdraw
any benefits conferred specifically on that state.55 Retaliation and reputational sanctions, though, remain available to curb unauthorized exit. In particular, unauthorized exit is a violation of a legal obligation that can result
in a reduction of a state’s reputation for complying with legal rules.56 As
with all sanctions, in any given instance the sanction may be insufficient to
deter illegal exit. But by raising the sanctions for exiting an agreement,
states can make exit less likely.
B. Provisions Affecting Exit Costs
There are a variety of legal provisions that affect the costs associated with
withdrawal from a legal agreement. These include exit provisions, sunset
provisions, and clauses designed to ensure that an obligation is or is not
legally binding. These three types of provisions each reduce exit costs in
different ways.
Withdrawal or denunciation clauses generally allow a state the unilateral
option to legally withdraw from or denounce an agreement, sometimes
when certain conditions are met or sometimes simply at its discretion.57 For
example, the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) permits withdrawal unconditionally with six months notice.58 By contrast, the NPT only permits withdrawal if a nation determines
“that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country,” and requires that the
withdrawing state explain those circumstances.59
The purpose of withdrawal clauses is to reduce or eliminate the legal consequences of treaty withdrawal.60 A state that withdraws in accordance with
54. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS 33 (2008).
55. Of course, if the good produced by cooperation is a public good, reciprocity is not available as a
sanction for a very different reason. To withdraw the benefits of the agreement from the now-exited state
would mean ceasing cooperation entirely.
56. Where retaliation is concerned, it is important to distinguish between retaliation that occurs
because the exit is illegal, and retaliation that would have occurred regardless of whether the exit was
illegal. The latter is really a political sanction; it does not depend on the terms of the agreement being
exited.
57. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1582.
58. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144.
59. NPT, supra note 21, art. X(1).
60. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1590. Treaty withdrawal, of course, can have non-legal
consequences, such as political or information consequences. See id. at 1608. My study is in this respect
both narrower and broader than prior work on treaty exit. This paper is broader in the sense that it
focuses on all provisions that affect the legal cost of permanently exiting an agreement, but it is narrower
in the sense that it only focuses on “legal” costs, such as reputational sanctions that are based on the
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an exit provision does so lawfully and thus does not, in theory, suffer a
reduction in its reputation for complying with international agreements. For
example, in recent years Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have all
threatened to withdraw from the United Nations Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
(“ICSID Convention”).61 In 2007, Bolivia followed through, exercising its
rights under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention to withdraw with six
months notice.62 Ecuador, for its part, issued a notification under Article
25(4) that withdrew its consent to ICSID jurisdiction over disputes involving oil and minerals.63 Ecuador also withdrew from nine bilateral investment treaties and used the threat of exit to begin renegotiating others.64
Soft law agreements work in a similar fashion to withdrawal clauses: making an agreement soft reduces the cost of exit. Doctrinal distinctions between legally binding agreements are functional signals about the future
likelihood of compliance.65 From a compliance perspective, then, the chief
difference between hard law and soft law agreements is the likelihood of
future compliance signaled by the designation. Hard legal obligations, by
virtue of being legally binding, represent the most significant pledge of a
state’s reputation for compliance with international law.66 Soft legal obligations, by contrast, are those obligations that are not legally binding, but
which nevertheless produce legal consequences.67 By designating an agreement as legally binding, states signal a high likelihood of future compliance
and so failing to comply, all else equal, results in a larger reputational sanction.68 This is so because going forward other states will devalue the signal
sent by signing a hard law agreement with the violating state, which can
cost the violating state in terms of being able to extract concessions from its
cooperative partners or induce their reliance.69
The distinction between hard law and soft law is relevant to exit costs in
the same way that it is to run of the mine violations of international law.70
legality of an agreement or whether certain actions are deemed “legal” as judged against an agreement’s
rules.
61. Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory
Analysis, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 533 & nn.113–14 (2009).
62. See News Release, Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Bolivia Submits a Notice Under
Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (May 16, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
StaticFiles/Announcement3.html.
63. See News Release, Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Ecuador’s Notification under Article
25(4) of the ICSID Convention (Dec. 5, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/
Announcement9.html.
64. Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign
Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT’L L. J. 491, 493 (2009).
65. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy Meyer, International Common Law: The Soft Law of International
Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 515, 519 (2009).
66. Guzman & Meyer, International Soft Law, supra note 19, at 23.
67. Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15, at 890.
68. Guzman & Meyer, International Soft Law, supra note 19, at 23.
69. Id.
70. Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15, at 915.
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“Exiting” a treaty that does not permit withdrawal is a violation of the
implied obligation not to exit the agreement and carries with it a reputational sanction that is in part determined by the legal status of the obligation exited. For example, in 2005 the United States announced its
“withdrawal” from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (“VCCR”), which conferred jurisdiction on the International Court of Justice to hear disputes arising under the VCCR. Notably,
however, the VCCR does not contain a provision authorizing such a withdrawal. And though the VCLT recognizes that in some instances it may be
legally permissible to withdraw from a treaty that lacks an explicit withdrawal mechanism,71 as a practical matter states are, in the absence of express authorization, at best likely to have conflicting views about the
legality of a specific withdrawal. It thus seems safe to infer that the United
States suffered a loss of reputation for exiting the VCCR, and to infer that
the loss of reputation was larger than it would have been had the VCCR
been a soft law agreement.72
Finally, in contrast to exit provisions and the legality of an agreement,
which place the onus of action on states seeking to exit, sunset provisions
(and framework agreements, for that matter) usually require collective action
to extend the agreement.73 The default rule established in the agreement
will determine precisely what the collective action is necessary for, and what
decision rule the collective action is taken under. In general, though, the
costs of using a sunset provision to exit an agreement will be higher than for
using an exit clause, particularly in the multilateral context. This is because
sunset provisions typically authorize a majority to make a decision for all. A
state wishing to use a sunset provision to exit an agreement must therefore
assemble a coalition of states to defeat renewal. The classic example of such a
sunset provision is Article X(2) of the NPT. The provision required the
parties to the treaty to vote, twenty-five years after the treaty came into
force, on whether to extend the treaty indefinitely or for further fixed periods.74 Such a provision requires a majority vote to extend the life of the
treaty.75
71. VCLT, supra note 53.
72. Soft law agreements are also not “treaties” and are thus not governed by the rules in the VCLT,
including the default rule that withdrawal is generally not permitted unless explicitly authorized. It is
possible, therefore, that exiting soft law agreements are governed by a different default rule or no default
rule at all.
73. Automatic renewals unless a state objects are another possibility.
74. NPT, supra note 21, art. X(2).
75. Another less obvious type of sunset provision is one in which a state commits to completing a
certain action by a certain date but does not covenant to continue the action after the date has passed. For
example, the Moscow Treaty of 2002 commits the United States and Russia to reduce their arsenal of
strategic nuclear warheads to between 1700 and 2200 by December 31, 2012. Regardless of whether that
obligation is met, though, the parties have no further obligations under the Moscow Treaty after 2012;
indeed, to remove any doubt on this score article IV provides that the treaty shall only remain in force
until December 31, 2012—the last day the parties have to complete their obligations under the treaty.
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C. Exit versus Violation
Renegotiation challenges the cherished notion of international law as a
means of regulating state behavior because renegotiation carries with it a
suggestion of willful and opportunistic disobedience. One might therefore
wonder why states would bargain over exit costs at all, given that states may
always violate their legal commitments, and in so doing, try to prompt a
renegotiation. Exit and violation are not equivalent from the standpoint of
inducing renegotiation, however. To see why exit is of particular importance
to renegotiation, and therefore to agreement design, it is important to understand the various motivations states have for not complying with international law.
I use the term “noncompliance” differently than it is used in most literature on the subject. Noncompliance is often employed as an umbrella term
to refer to any deviation from established substantive rules of conduct, regardless of whether those deviations are justified under prevailing rules. Exit
and violation are both forms of noncompliance, and the international relations literature has therefore tended to conflate the two.76 Although exit can
be a violation of an agreement—as it arguably was when the United States
“withdrew” from the VCCR—exit can also be perfectly lawful. For example, a state can denounce a treaty in accordance with a provision authorizing
such denunciation.77
All noncompliance—exit and violation—withholds the benefits of cooperation from other states. All noncompliance can therefore be used to impose
costs on cooperative partners in an effort to spur renegotiation. However,
noncompliance or the threat thereof undertaken with renegotiation in mind
is fundamentally different from the noncompliance that occupies much of
the attention of international legal scholars in several respects. First, and
perhaps most obviously, the two are not doctrinally equivalent.
After exit, a set of rules no longer applies to the exiting state. The sanctions for breach authorized by the exited agreement, the VCLT, or the customary international rules of state responsibility are only implicated by a
violation, not by a lawful exit.78
Second, renegotiation-driven noncompliance tends to be public, whereas
states frequently try to hide violations of international law. Hiding a violation confers two benefits on a state: 1) it reduces or eliminates the sanctions
associated with violation, and 2) it may induce a state’s partners to continue
to cooperate. The other states’ continued cooperation means that the violating state reaps the benefits of its partners’ adherence to the law without
having to pay the costs of such adherence itself. Provisions in agreements
See Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, U.S.-Russ., arts. 1, 4, May 24, 2002, S. TREATY DOC. No.
107-8.
76. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1613.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1616–17.
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focusing on deterring violations are thus usually aimed at monitoring compliance and producing information about violation upon which sanctions
can be based. These information-producing mechanisms are not needed to
detect exit, as exit is made public by design.
Third, exit is superior to violation in creating leverage for renegotiation.
Even when violations are public, they often fail to demonstrate a state’s
resolve in seeking a renegotiation. Unlike most violations, exit allows a state
to credibly signal that it is serious about renegotiating the existing regime.
Exit therefore provides states with a distinct tool as they seek to renegotiate
their legal obligations.
Once a state completely exits a regime, it loses access to any of the regime’s selective benefits, such as participation in dispute resolution
processes, monitoring, rule-making, and information-sharing bodies.79 A violating state, on the other hand, leaves itself the possibility of coming back
into compliance with its obligations.80 And while a state that has exited an
agreement may try to reaccede to the agreement, rejoining may be subject to
review by other members or by the institution itself. For example, in 1998
Trinidad & Tobago withdrew from both the American Convention on
Human Rights and the First Optional Protocol to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (“First Optional Protocol”), which confers
jurisdiction on the Human Rights Committee to review petitions from individuals.81 Trinidad & Tobago then tried to reaccede to the First Optional
Protocol with a reservation that would have eliminated the jurisdiction of
the Human Rights Committee to review petitions from capital defendants.82
The Human Rights Committee essentially struck the reservation down,
holding it incompatible with the object and purpose of the First Optional
Protocol. Consequently, Trinidad & Tobago chose to remain outside of the
First Optional Protocol entirely.83

79. Id. at 1613–15. In some instances, withdrawing does not mean a total loss of voice in rule-making
procedures. Some international institutions, such as the International Criminal Court, still allow nonparties to participate as “observers.” See David Scheffer, Keynote Address: The Future U.S. Relationship with
the International Criminal Court, 17 PACE INT’L L. REV. 161, 175 (2005).
80. At some point the costs of violation—be they reputational or retaliatory—will be large enough to
demonstrate the violating state’s resolve to hold out for renegotiation. In most cases, however, the costs
associated with violation will be small enough to leave states uncertain as to the violating state’s resolve.
81. See Helfer, Overlegalizing, supra note 30, at 1881.
82. Id.
83. Id. In another example, when Iceland sought to rejoin the International Whaling Commission
(“IWC”) it did so with a contentious reservation to the IWC’s moratorium on whaling. This reservation,
and thus Iceland’s reaccession to the IWC, was twice rejected before ultimately being approved in a
convoluted series of procedural votes. Alexander Gillespie, Iceland’s Reservation at the International Whaling
Commission, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 977, 977–78 (2003).
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SHIFTING POWER

The central puzzle of agreement design in relation to renegotiation is why
negotiators would agree to give future bargaining power to potentially dissatisfied states. Of course, future bargaining power is good for the potentially dissatisfied state, and in some situations that bargaining power may be
good for states generally.84 As I have argued elsewhere, where a majority of
states are primarily interested in coordinating their behavior regardless of
the specific rules chosen, employing soft law to reduce exit costs confers
power on a minority of states for whom the specific rules chosen are more
important than coordination. Soft law, in effect, acts as a delegation to that
minority to drive the evolution of legal rules.85 In such situations, the gains
from a more efficient system of implementing welfare-enhancing amendments outweigh the costs of opportunistic revisionism. But oftentimes tension in the interests of the parties will be high and distributional concerns
will be paramount. How do we make sense of conferring future bargaining
power on potentially dissatisfied states in those situations?
Below, I present a theory of bargaining in the shadow of shifting power
that answers this question. In so doing, I make standard assumptions about
state behavior: states are unitary, behave rationally, and act in their own selfinterest (that is, they have no inherent preference for cooperation).86 These
assumptions ignore important determinants of state behavior, such as constructivist processes of preference formation, interest group interactions, and
the interplay of domestic political and legal forces. Nevertheless, they are
useful because they allow us to focus our attention on the dynamics of interstate negotiation, rather than on how states determine what objectives to
pursue in those negotiations.
A. The Logic of Renegotiation
To understand how states bargain in the shadow of shifting power, one
first has to understand what happens when power has actually shifted. How
does renegotiation occur?
84. See Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15, at 892.
85. Id. at 892–93.
86. These assumptions are widely used to study international legal behavior. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH &
POSNER, supra note 6, at 4; GUZMAN, supra note 54, at 17; ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE
LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2006);
Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE
J. INT’L L. 335, 348–51 (1989); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International
Law, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1999); Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy:
An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1330 (2004); John
K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and
Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997); Edward T.
Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559, 560–62 (2002); Koremenos, supra note 4, at 293–94.
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1. Outside Options and Credible Threats
For states to successfully engage in renegotiation, it must be the case that
all states involved do better under the renegotiated terms than they do
under the alternative. Critically, however, the alternative is not necessarily
the existing agreement.87 Consider two different scenarios. In the first, conditions have changed such that the current agreement no longer maximizes
the collective welfare of the parties. Put differently, the agreement is no
longer on the Pareto frontier. There is thus an amendment or a set of substantive rules that would make at least one party better off without making
any other party worse off, relative to the existing deal. In the absence of
transaction costs, we would expect renegotiation to occur here regardless of
the level of exit costs.
But an amendment that makes everyone better off is not necessary for
renegotiation to be rational for all parties. In the second scenario, changed
conditions have only affected a single state. That state now has a privately
available alternative—an outside option88—that is more valuable than cooperation under the existing agreement. Note that the outside option is issuespecific. A state may have a good outside option on one issue but not on
others. For example, a state may have a high payoff from noncooperation on
climate change because it is a developing nation that benefits from industrialization but poor outside options on security or trade issues. This outside
option scenario, in game theoretic terms, allows the ascendant state to make
a credible threat to exit the existing agreement.89 Either the ascendant state
will exit and take its outside option, leaving other states with the value from
their next-best alternative to the status quo,90 or there will be a renegotiation that makes the ascendant state at least as well off as it would be taking
its outside option. Significantly, this renegotiation can leave other states
worse off than they would have been under the existing agreement.91 A declining state will be willing to make concessions to the ascendant state up to
the point at which the declining state’s outside option is better for it than
conceding enough to keep the ascendant state in the existing agreement.

87. GRUBER, supra note 1, at 7.
88. David M. Andrews, Monetary Policy Coordination and Hierarchy, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
POWER 91, 102 (David M. Andrews ed., 2006); see also Avner Shaked & John Sutton, Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 52 ECONOMETRICA 1351, 1355 (1984).
89. In the language of game theory, a “threat” is a “promise to carry out a certain action if another
player deviates from his equilibrium actions.” ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 83 (1989). A threat is “credible” only if the strategy is an equilibrium on all
possible paths in a game. Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1306 (1990).
90. A declining state’s next best alternative could be to carry out the agreement without the ascendant state. This is not really an “outside option” because it is not outside of the existing agreement, but
rather is a forced modification of it.
91. GRUBER, supra note 1, at 6–7.
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2. How Is the Value of a State’s Outside Option Determined?
Renegotiation is therefore driven by the value of a state’s outside option.
Put differently, an outside option determines to a large extent a state’s bargaining power. It is worth noting that a state’s outside option may not be
the alternative that makes the state best-off, as measured by the overall welfare of the state’s citizens. Rather, the outside option refers to the payoff
received by the state’s decisionmakers after taking into account the domestic
political pressures that come to bear on them. In any form of government,
agency problems may emerge in which a state’s government’s incentives differ from the interests of the population at large. For example, a domestic
interest group with veto power may develop a vested interest in continuing
to comply with the prevailing terms of cooperation. In such a situation, the
interest group may block efforts to use a state’s outside option to renegotiate, even when the outside option is in some sense better for the nation as a
whole. An emergent middle class in a developing country that has joined
the WTO (such as China) may block serious efforts to renegotiate, even if
renegotiation might increase citizens’ overall welfare.92 The reverse might
also be true. A domestic political constituency, such as the military in a
country building an illicit nuclear weapon, may be vested in using an
outside option to drive renegotiation, even if the status quo is arguably better for the state’s citizens as a whole.
Outside options are affected by many factors. The existence of competing
legal regimes can affect a state’s outside option, as when an alternative regime offers rules that are more favorable to a particular state.93 For example,
Raustiala and Victor count five different international agreements that set
rules governing property rights in plant genetic resources.94 Similarly, the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and the associated
regulatory regime presided over by the International Whaling Commission
(“IWC”) offer a competing approach to regulating international whaling
from the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (“NAMMCO”).95
Indeed, the IWC and NAMMCO have competed for members, with states
such as Iceland moving from the more restrictive IWC to the more permissive NAMMCO (and back again).96
A change in how states view issue linkages can also affect the value of a
state’s outside option. In perhaps the best known case of exit-driven renegotiation, the United States and the European Union withdrew from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) (1947) in 1994 and acceded
to the WTO, essentially forcing developing nations to follow suit or lose
92. I am grateful to Jide Nzelibe for this example.
93. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1583; Raustiala & Victor, supra note 50, at 295.
94. Raustiala & Victor, supra note 50, at 283–84.
95. See David D. Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal
Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 154, 155 (1995).
96. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1583.
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their most-favored nation trading status with both the United States and the
European Union.97 This maneuver was conceived of in 1990 and executed to
end the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.98 Steinberg has argued that
the maneuver was made possible by the end of the Cold War.99 While the
United States had considered using the possibility of exit to generate
favorable bargaining results at the end of the Tokyo Round negotiations in
1979, it ultimately decided not to because of the cost in security terms of
pushing developing nations toward the Soviet Union.100 When the end of
the Cold War broke the linkage between security policies and trade policies,
the United States and the European Union’s bargaining power in the GATT
increased considerably.
Relatedly, a shift in a state’s preferences can change how it perceives the
value of its various options. Such a shift can occur in at least two different
ways. First, the preferences of actors within a state can shift. Such shifts can
happen through the work of epistemic communities that imbue actors with
new patterns of reasoning, leading them to pursue new interests.101 Similarly, transnational networks of activists can use international norms to galvanize public support for positions that constrain or shape the actions of
domestic political actors.102 Second, shifts can happen through changes in
government. When a different set of domestic actors with a different set of
preferences gains control of the apparatus of state, the state’s preferences
necessarily change.103 The change from the Clinton administration to the
Bush administration in 2001 illustrates how a change in government can
change a state’s preferences. While the Clinton administration signed both
the Kyoto Protocol and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, the Bush administration declined to pursue ratification of either and
went so far as to “unsign” the latter.104
A state’s outside option can also improve with the development of a particular technological capacity. Consider, for example, states that are interested in developing and testing a nuclear deterrent. Before they have
acquired such a deterrent, states such as North Korea or Iran may be happy
to remain within a legal framework that denies them the right to possess

97. Steinberg, supra note 12, at 359–60.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 359.
100. Id. at 358–59.
101. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, in KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY COORDINATION 1–3 (Peter M. Haas ed., 1992); see also Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54
DUKE L. J. 621, 626 (2004).
102. Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 16–25 (1998).
103. See Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L. J. 231, 257 (2009)
(discussing the reputational consequences of changes in government).
104. See Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2061–62, 2064 (2003).
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nuclear weapons.105 Once they develop a nuclear weapon, however, exiting
the legal regime becomes a more attractive option and creates leverage to
renegotiate the terms of their status in the broader nuclear nonproliferation
regime. This is exactly the tactic North Korea employed in withdrawing
from the NPT. Following its 2003 withdrawal, North Korea engaged in a
prolonged series of negotiations in an attempt to obtain concessions on security and economic aid from the United States, China, Japan, South Korea,
and Russia in exchange for nuclear disarmament.106
Finally, because having valuable alternatives increases bargaining power,
states may actively invest in developing outside options. States, in other
words, have an incentive to undermine cooperation on existing terms by
developing alternatives to be used as leverage.107 The United States pursued
exactly this strategy when it established the Asia-Pacific Partnership on
Clean Development and Climate (“AP-6”). The AP-6 is a nonbinding organization, consisting of the United States, Japan, South Korea, India,
China, and Australia, that is somewhat of an alternative to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) and the Kyoto Protocol thereto.108 Similarly, in the intellectual property area,
developed and developing nations have sought out or established competing
fora for international lawmaking. The United States, for example, initially
pursued the TRIPS Agreement through GATT because of a stalemate on
patent protection standards at the World Intellectual Property Organization.109 The result of developing valuable alternatives is that an agreement
that is stable today—one in which no state can force a renegotiation by
credibly threatening to exit—may be rendered unstable tomorrow. The likelihood of future renegotiation depends on the likelihood that a state’s option
will become more valuable to it than cooperation under existing rules—a
probability that states can increase through their own efforts.
3. How Do Exit Costs Affect a State’s Outside Option?
States are not without the tools to combat shifting power, but they are
also not able to completely contract out of the threat of renegotiation. Bargaining power is, as I have already suggested, affected by the formal terms of
an agreement. It is, in other words, affected by law. States can at the time of
drafting an agreement raise the costs of exit. They may choose not to include
a denunciation clause or to limit the circumstances under which parties may
denounce an agreement. They may lengthen the duration of an agreement or
105. Of course, in attempting to develop a nuclear weapons capability while in the nonproliferation
regime, states such as Iran and North Korea will typically be violating their nonproliferation obligations.
106. See generally U.S. and Other Powers Reach Tentative Understanding on North Korea’s Nuclear Program,
99 AM. J. INT’L. L. 889, 914–16 (2005).
107. Raustiala & Victor, supra note 50, at 295–97; Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1583.
108. See US agrees climate deal with Asia, BBC NEWS, July 28, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/sci/tech/4723305.stm.
109. Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 27, at 20.
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make the agreement of indefinite duration. By drafting exit provisions so as
to make exit more costly, states make it less likely that a shift in the value of
a state’s outside option will allow a state to force a renegotiation. Thus, even
if an ascendant state’s outside option is more valuable to it than cooperation
under current rules, a state may not have a credible threat to exit that will
permit it to demand a renegotiation. Instead, an ascendant state’s outside
option less exit costs must exceed the ascendant state’s existing share of the
gains from cooperation. The effect of exit costs, then, is to shift bargaining
power in favor of declining states. Exit costs and the stability they bring to
the international legal system therefore have distributional consequences.
That states can reduce the likelihood of renegotiation by curbing exit
invites the question why they do not entirely eliminate the possibility. In
economic contracting literature, for example, scholars have spent a great deal
of effort studying mechanisms that eliminate such future bargaining power
and make a contract renegotiation-proof.110 I explain below why states often
will not avail themselves of the highest level of exit costs available. However, there at least three independent reasons why states, even if they wanted
to, would not be able to entirely eliminate the possibility of renegotiation.
First, as is familiar to scholars of international law, the absence of a thirdparty enforcer of legal rules capable of awarding damages will generally
mean that states cannot create efficient incentives for performance.111 Instead, states must balance the benefits of reducing violations and renegotiations with the costs that come with more stringent penalties for exit.112
Second, even where domestic contracts are concerned, incentives to breach
are often associated with renegotiation.113 Many contract remedies are not
perfectly efficient—i.e., not perfectly compensatory—and thus renegotiation is often necessary to reach the efficient allocation of resources.114 Third,
one might think that states should engage in contingent or complete contracting as a way to eliminate renegotiation. That is to say, states should be
able to draft an agreement that adjusts the substantive terms based on shifts
in the values of states’ outside options. A complete contract that envisioned
all possible shifts in power would not require any renegotiation as power
shifted. Of course, complete contracting is rarely, if ever, observed in any
field of contracting, let alone in international agreements.115 This is in part
because contracting is costly, and in most situations the number of possible
110. See, e.g., Oliver D. Hart & Jean Tirole, Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics, 55 REV.
ECON. STUD. 509 (1988).
111. See Guzman & Meyer, International Soft Law, supra note 19, at 20–21.
112. Id. at 22–24.
113. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 629, 633–42 (1988).
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L. J. 541, 594–95 (2003) (“These considerations imply that contracts will inevitably be incomplete.”); Richard Craswell, The ‘Incomplete Contracts’ Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 151, 156 n.12 (2005) (noting that “ ‘complete’ contracts are rarely if ever observed”).
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future scenarios is so vast as to prohibit complete contracts.116 Moreover,
deferring the cost of negotiating over any given contingency to a future
(re)negotiation will often make sense because at the time of initial contracting, such future costs are discounted both by time and by the
probability that the particular contingency in question will come to pass.117
The possibility of a future shift in a state’s outside option that leads to a
credible threat of exit, then, must be a paramount consideration in drafting
provisions affecting exit costs. By lowering the cost of exit, an agreement’s
negotiators confer some increased measure of future bargaining power on
states likely to be dissatisfied down the road with existing legal rules. To be
sure, explicit decision-making rules also affect the possibility and outcomes
of future renegotiations. Examples of decision-making rules include onestate, one-vote majoritarian voting; one-state, one-vote supermajoritarian
voting; weighted voting (with either a simple majority or a super-majority
necessary to pass an amendment); or unanimity, which, predicated on the
doctrine of sovereign equality, is by far the most common type of amendment procedure.118 And bargaining power will also depend on a number of
political and economic factors not directly accounted for in the formal provisions of an agreement. But the costs of exit that derive from the agreement
are an important source of bargaining power. Reducing these costs makes it
more likely that states will be able to demand that the gains from cooperation be redistributed in their favor, regardless of the specific decision rule
under which they are operating. Low exit costs confer potential future bargaining power on states whose cooperation in an agreement is most valuable
to other agreement members.
B. Bargaining Over Exit Costs in the Shadow of Shifting Power
Renegotiation is not a new problem. What is new to international legal
literature is thinking about how states bargain in light of the possibility of
future renegotiation occasioned by shifts in bargaining power. Bargaining
power is simply not static. If a state expects its bargaining power to increase
in the future, it will be reluctant to agree to terms today unless it is guaranteed that those terms will not prejudice its expected future position. At the
same time, states that are powerful today may wish to lock in their transitory power through legal mechanisms, such as high exit costs, that reduce
the threat of future renegotiations that might occur when they are in a
weaker position. In other words, declining states may wish to use formal
116. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 115, at 595 (“There is an infinite number of possible future
states and a very large set of possible partner types. When the sum of possible states and partner types is
infinite and contracting is costly, contracts must contain gaps. Parties cannot write contracts about
everything.”).
117. There is also an agency problem. The initial negotiators may not be in power during the renegotiation, and so by deferring negotiations over contingencies into the future, they may entirely avoid the
transaction costs of trying to write a complete contract.
118. See Steinberg, supra note 12, at 339–40.
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mechanisms to convert their present bargaining power into long-term substantive gains, while ascendant states will be hesitant to commit themselves
to agreements that lock in substantive terms based on current bargaining
power. How will states resolve this conflict?
Consider the following hypothetical. Two states negotiate over an agreement. They have to divide the gains from cooperation. The choice of substantive rules determines how those gains are allocated once the agreement
comes into force.119 In negotiating over the substance of an agreement, no
state will be willing to accept any rules that leave it worse off than its
outside option. Thus, each state’s outside option restricts the range of possible agreements. Moreover, the outside option of one state, the ascendant
state, is increasing over time as the state grows in power, while the outside
option of the declining state remains constant or loses value.
Now imagine that exiting the agreement is costless.120 Each time a state’s
outside option increased so that it exceeded the value to that state of cooperating under the existing agreement, it would have a credible threat to exit
the agreement. Faced with such a credible threat, the declining state would
concede just enough to make cooperation worth the ascendant state’s
while.121 If at any point the sum of the two states’ outside options ever
exceeded one hundred percent of the benefits from cooperation, the agreement would collapse because neither side would be willing to make the
necessary concessions to keep cooperation viable. Under such an agreement,
the transaction costs associated with renegotiation would be the only brake
on the renegotiation of the substantive rules. If transaction costs were minimal, legal rules would evolve to track the underlying distribution of bargaining power, just as the realist theory discussed above predicts.
It follows that in a world without the ability to commit through exit
costs, expected shifts in power are largely irrelevant in negotiating an agreement. Because an ascendant state cannot credibly commit not to exploit its
bargaining power tomorrow, the declining state will not make any substantive concessions in order to prevail on the formal aspects of the agreement.
An agreement would be based purely on the current configuration of power
and would last only so long as that configuration lasted. This situation
might disadvantage declining states, which would prefer to negotiate an
agreement that locks in their gains and does not leave them susceptible to
119. I assume throughout most of this discussion that all possible agreements are on the Pareto
frontier. This assumption allows me to highlight distributional issues.
120. For purposes of this thought experiment, I assume that sanctioning opportunistic noncompliance
is a separate and distinct mechanism from sanctioning exit. Thus, one can assume that levels of compliance are the same regardless of the chosen level of exit costs. In reality, of course, factors such as the
legality of an agreement affect the sanctions applied both for permanently and publicly exiting an agreement and for opportunistically violating an agreement. However, other mechanisms that influence exit
costs, such as withdrawal provisions and sunset provisions, do not affect sanctions for violating an
agreement.
121. See Powell, supra note 3, at 93–97.
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future forced renegotiations. Moreover, the inability to commit can reduce
the overall gains from cooperation by removing the potential for agreements
that add value over time through investment in cooperation.122
As discussed above, adding exit costs changes this dynamic by allowing
states to commit to not take advantage of any changes in their relative fortunes. If an ascendant state must pay a cost to exit an agreement, it can no
longer freely obtain its outside option. This reallocation of future bargaining
power means that agreeing to high exit costs is a substantial concession for a
state that expects to become more powerful over time. A state giving up
that power at the time of contracting will expect to be compensated for it.
More specifically, if by agreeing to high exit costs a state is giving away its
ability to renegotiate better substantive terms in the future, the state will
demand better substantive terms now as compensation. Declining states are
thus put in the position of having to choose to yield on the level of exit
costs, and thereby leave themselves vulnerable to renegotiation if and when
the ascendant state becomes more powerful, or give some larger share of the
gains from cooperation to the ascendant state now. Nor does it matter
whether a state’s expectations ultimately turn out to be correct. At the time
of negotiation, each state has expectations about its own future bargaining
power and that of its negotiating partners. States bargain on the basis of
those expectations, regardless of whether those expectations ultimately turn
out to have been wise judgments.123
A brief numerical example illustrates the point (a somewhat more formal
argument appears in footnote 126). An ascendant state, A, has an outside
option worth 40 during the period in which it is negotiating an agreement
with a declining state, D, to divide the surplus from cooperation, which is
equal to 100 per period. Suppose, for simplicity, that A and D know for
certain that the value of A’s outside option in the second period will be 65,
and A’s discount rate is .9. A fifty-fifty division of the surplus is therefore
vulnerable to renegotiation in the second period unless the agreement has
exit costs of at least 15 (65 – 50 = 15).124 If exit costs are at least 15, A can
do no better than 50 in the second period by exiting and therefore does not

122. See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803 (1989) (“For economic growth to occur the sovereign or government must not merely establish the relevant set of rights,
but must also make a credible commitment to them.”).
123. States’ expectations about their own options are, perhaps intuitively, likely to prove more accurate than their forecasts about the fortunes of others. In developing expectations about others, states will
have to rely on whatever information they can obtain publicly or through other means. In part due to
concerns about the information on which they base their beliefs about the future, states may discount
their expectations according to how reliable they think their forecasts are. In particular, states may
discount expectations that reach further into the future on the grounds that such expectations are less
likely to be accurate than short-term expectations.
124. I choose a fifty-fifty division in this example only because it corresponds to the Nash bargaining
solution.
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have a credible threat to exit.125 Exit costs of 15 or more, then, prevent
renegotiation. But will A agree to exit costs of 15 and a fifty-fifty division?
A simple comparison of utilities indicates that the answer is no. If A
agrees to the proposal, then its utility is:
UA = 50 + 50(.9) = 95.
If A rejects the proposal, preferring its outside option from the beginning,
then:
UA = 40 + 65(.9) = 98.5.
Clearly, in such a situation D will have to compromise either on its preferred
level of exit costs or on substance in order to get an agreement. Specifically,
D will have to ensure that A’s present value from the deal is equal to 98.5,
so that A receives at least as much by agreeing as it does by exercising its
outside option from the beginning. This can be done either by increasing
A’s share of the surplus (here to 98.5/1.9, or roughly 51.8), or reducing the
level of exit costs to allow renegotiation. In the scenario in which exit costs
are low enough to allow renegotiation, assuming the agreement calls for a
fifty-fifty division in the first round, exit costs can be no higher than
roughly 11.1 (98.5 = 50 + (.9)(65 – c), where c is equal to exit costs). Note
that exit costs still matter even when renegotiation occurs—they reduce the
value of A’s outside option and therefore reduce what A gets in a
renegotiation.
D’s preferred concession is that which maximizes its utility. D’s utility
from a deal that divides the benefits from cooperation fifty-fifty but has exit
costs that permit renegotiation in the second round is:
UD = 50 + dD(100 − (65 − c)),
where c cannot be higher than 11.1 and therefore D’s utility in the second
period cannot be higher than 46.1 (dD is D’s discount rate). D’s utility from
conceding on substance but retaining exit costs high enough to prevent renegotiation is roughly:
UD = 48.2 + dD(48.2).
Clearly, D prefers conceding on the substantive terms of an agreement for a
wide range of values of dD. For sufficiently low values of dD (or for different
distribution of the benefits under the initial agreement), however, D will
prefer to concede on exit costs and capitalize on its ability to lock in a larger
benefit in the first round.126
125. This analysis assumes that D has all of the structural bargaining power in a renegotiation, such
that A receives only its outside option. In most bargaining protocols, however, A would do better than
its outside option, thereby even further improving the position of the ascendant state.
126. This example can be expressed more formally as a game with two phases in which states bargain
over and implement an agreement characterized by a distribution of benefits, x, and a level of exit costs,
c. Because a formal model does not improve significantly on the insights discussed above, I only sketch
what such a model would look like. In each phase, states have the opportunity to negotiate or renegotiate
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This numerical example highlights a significant point about the stability
of international law, one that is perhaps obvious but sometimes overlooked.
In the example, exit costs have distributional ramifications. Even if they do
not prevent renegotiation, exit costs increase D’s payoff in round two while
reducing A’s payoff by a similar amount. Exit costs accomplish this redistribution from the ascendant to the declining state by preventing renegotiation
or, where renegotiation does occur, reducing what an ascendant state can get
by exiting an agreement. Put differently, increasing the stability of international law through higher exit costs has distributional ramifications. More
generally, rigid formal mechanisms—whatever benefits they may have in
terms of expanding the possibilities and benefits of cooperation, as when
they permit more accurate reliance—have distributional consequences that undermine the ability of states to create stable international legal rules.
The broader insight—that expected future shifts in power can affect bargaining over the tradeoff between form and substance—is crucial to understanding why international agreements often lack terms that seem to make
an agreement, which is then immediately implemented. If bargaining concludes without an agreement in
place, each state receives in each phase the value of its outside option (at, dt). At the beginning of Phase
Two, A’s outside option becomes higher by some amount d a, such that a2 = a1 + d a. A’s reservation
price therefore is:
UA= a1 + dA(a1 + D a).

(1)

A’s utility from entering into an agreement is:
UA = x + dA(max{x, a1 + D a – c}).

(2)

In other words, A gets x in Phase One if it agrees and then gets the larger of the two bracketed
expressions in Phase Two. The second expression in brackets is the value of A’s outside option less the
cost of exiting the agreement. For simplicity, I assume that in a renegotiation A gets only the value of its
outside option less the cost of exiting. This amounts to assuming that D has all the structural bargaining
power in a renegotiation. In order for A to participate in the agreement, equation (2) must be larger than
equation (1). Simplifying that inequality yields A’s participation constraint, or the formula that must be
satisfied if A is to enter the agreement:
(x – a1) + dA(max{x, a1 + D a – c}– (a1 + D a)) ≥ 0

(3)

The left-hand side of equation (3) is A’s net utility from participating in the agreement. Inspecting
equation (3) indicates that an increase in x, not surprisingly, increases A’s utility. An increase in c, on the
other hand, reduces A’s welfare from the agreement. It does this in two ways. Most obviously, in the
event that renegotiation occurs (that is, when x < a1 + d a – c) A’s payoff in Phase Two is reduced from
its outside option by the level of exit costs. Second, if c prevents renegotiation (if x < a1 + d a, but x ≥ a1
+ d a – c) c reduces A’s payoff in Phase Two by the difference between x and some larger renegotiated
amount (e.g., a1 + d a).
Assuming renegotiation is always successful, D’s per-period payoff from an agreement is 1 minus A’s
per period payoff. D’s reservation price is defined analogously to A’s in equation (1). D’s participation
constraint is therefore:
(1 – x – d1) + dD(min{(1 – x), ( 1 – a1 – d a + c)} – d2) ≥ 0

(4)

Again, the left-hand side of the equation is D’s net utility from the agreement. Comparing the sign on c
in equations (3) and (4) indicates that c is distributional. That is, exit costs reallocate the benefits of
cooperation from ascendant states to declining states. Comparing the inequalities above that control,
Phase Two payoffs also indicate that higher exit costs correspond to higher levels of stability in legal
rules. This leads to the conclusion that stability in legal rules has distributional implications—stability
favors declining states.
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sense when judged by present conditions. Potentially ascendant states will
either demand substantive rules that are not justified by their present alternatives to cooperation, or they will demand that they be able to easily exit
the agreement in the future. How, then, will states decide whether it is
better to concede on form or substance? In the remainder of this section, I
discuss some of the variables that affect how states trade off form and substance in the presence of shifting power. I continue this discussion in Part
IV, where I consider broader implications of the theory for debates in the
international legal literature.
C. The Tradeoff
1. Discount Rates
In order to understand how states will make the tradeoff, it is useful to
keep in mind that the substance of an agreement and the agreement’s exit
costs operate at different points in time. The substance of an agreement
comes into play as soon as states implement their cooperative policies. Exit
costs do not factor in unless and until a state’s outside option improves,
something that is unlikely to happen until some time has passed. The result
is that substantive provisions have immediate value to the parties, but provisions governing exit costs only affect a state’s share of the surplus in the
future. Thus, if a declining state yields on the substantive provisions of an
agreement, it is giving up a present benefit—a larger share of the gains from
cooperation immediately upon the agreement taking effect—in exchange for
a long-term benefit—a reduction in the likelihood of renegotiation. This
tradeoff will not be worthwhile if a declining state heavily discounts the
future. A state with a short time horizon would prefer to lock in what benefits it can today at the expense of being able to cooperate on better terms in
the future.
In other words, where states have different discount rates, states that
heavily discount the future will prefer to concede on form in order to capture benefits on substance, while states that are patient will prefer to prevail
on form. This suggests an empirical prediction: perhaps counterintuitively,
the presence of different discount rates suggests that we should see higher
exit costs—or more constraining agreements—where rising powers discount
the future at a higher rate than their declining partners, but lower exit costs
where rising powers are relatively more patient.
To illustrate how discount rates can affect the tradeoff between exit costs
and substance, recall the numerical example given above and imagine that D
does not discount the future at all (that is, dD = 1; recall that A’s discount
rate was .9 above). In such a situation, D prefers to concede on substance and
obtain exit costs that prevent renegotiation. To see this, recall that D must
give A roughly 51.8 out of 100 in order to obtain exit costs sufficient to
prevent renegotiation. This leaves D with 48.2 in each period:
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UD = 48.2 + 48.2(1) = 96.4.
If instead D elects to concede on exit costs, effectively allowing a renegotiation in the second period, D does worse even if we assume, as above, that D
is able to obtain the highest exit costs to which A would possibly agree
while still agreeing to a fifty-fifty division:
UD = 50 + 46.1(1) = 96.1.
D’s utility in such a situation is still lower than its utility in prevailing on
exit costs. D thus prefers to prevail on exit costs and concede on substance
when it is the more patient party. However, as D becomes less patient than
A, the opposite result occurs. Using a discount rate of .8 for D, D’s utility to
conceding on substance to obtain a renegotiation-proof agreement is:
UD = 48.2 + 48.2(.8) = 86.76.
D’s utility to conceding on exit costs is:
UD = 50 + 46.1(.8) = 86.88.
Therefore, as D becomes less patient than A, D prefers to concede on exit
costs and allow A to renegotiate.127 This insight has potentially dramatic
implications. One might think that in many situations declining states are
likely to discount the future more heavily than their ascendant peers precisely because—or for the same reasons that—their situation is worsening.
Similarly, being an ascendant state may often be correlated with placing a
high value on the future—the same factors that cause a state to invest in
developing its outside options for the future may make the state more patient overall.
This suggests that in many cases we should expect low exit costs to be the
norm. Those states most likely to favor high exit costs (declining states) will
not push for high exit costs because they do not value the future as much as
ascendant states. Put differently, where relative changes in power are correlated with relative valuations of the future, we should expect to see low exit
costs. In such situations, high exit costs are not terribly important to either
ascendant or declining states.
2. Distributional Tension and the Benefits of Reliance
The distributional tension on a given issue will also play a significant role
in how ascendant and declining states bargain over form and substance. Sophisticated bargaining models in political science generally assume that a
127. Again, one can see this intuition worked out somewhat more formally by inspecting equations
(3) and (4). See supra note 126. In order for an agreement to be possible, both equations (3) and (4) must
be satisfied; that is, both states must have an incentive to participate in the agreement. Recall that in
equation (3), increasing exit costs reduces A’s utility, while in equation (4) c is a benefit to D. Because c
only matters in the second period, it is always modified by a state’s discount rate. Thus, as D becomes
more impatient and A becomes more patient, higher exit costs become less valuable for both parties.
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state’s offers can be continuous.128 Under such an assumption, there are an
infinite number of distributions (substantive rules) that can be supported by
an agreement. In the real world, though, offers are not continuous. Instead,
there are usually a number of discrete alternatives that the parties are considering. How many alternatives there are depends on a number of factors,
including the subject matter and political sensitivities. Bilateral arms control agreements that limit the number and use of certain categories of weapons, such as the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems129
or Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms130
agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia, approximate the assumption of continuity much more closely than multilateral
arms control agreements, such as the NPT, that attempt to outright ban a
certain category of weapons. The purpose of the latter tends to be to ban
certain types of conduct for either all states or groups of states, and is therefore not as susceptible to small changes in legal rights.
Where the distributional tension on an issue is high—where the available
options allocate the benefits from cooperation in dramatically different
ways—states may be more reluctant to yield on substance in exchange for
form. In effect, yielding on substance is too costly, so states will prefer to
settle for their less preferred level of exit costs, rather than compromise their
preferred substantive rules. This will be particularly true when a marginal
increase in exit costs does not result in a large decrease in the probability of
renegotiation. At the opposite extreme, where provisions imposing exit costs
are effective at deterring renegotiation, states will be more likely to insist on
their preferred form. In such situations, yielding on matters of form is too
costly unless justified by significant concessions on substance.
A second issue is that in many situations high exit costs may actually
increase the overall benefits from cooperation. I have so far assumed that
high exit costs do not affect the overall size of the benefits from cooperation.
However, stability of legal rules is often thought to improve the ability of
all parties to more accurately rely on their partners’ behavior.131 More accurate reliance may permit states to allocate resources in a way that is more
efficient over the long term, thus increasing overall welfare as against the
situation in which exit costs are lower and states cannot efficiently invest in
reliance. As discussed above (and in footnote), raising exit costs alone may
not be Pareto-improving because increased exit costs reduce the welfare of
ascendant states. Whether increased exit costs are Pareto-improving would
128. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 3, at 86–88.
129. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23
U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
130. Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, 16 U.N.
Disarmament Y.B., App. II at 450 (1991).
131. See Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1600; Swaine, supra note 104, at 2074 (“Where
parties are free to exit a relationship at any point and for any reason, they will under-invest in reliance—
that is, fail to depend upon the relationship’s perpetuation in ways that might be efficient.”).
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instead turn on whether an ascendant state’s share of the benefits from cooperation was larger than its costs of being constrained. If transaction costs are
low, however, transfers should exist that allow states to bargain around the
costs to an ascendant state of making exit difficult. There is thus reason to
think that all else equal, where stability increases overall welfare, states will
opt for high exit costs. Of course, transaction costs are often not low. In such
situations, bargaining around the costs imposed on ascendant states by high
exit costs may not be possible. Where ascendant states cannot be compensated for their loss from high exit costs, states may have to settle for an
agreement with low exit costs that is not on the Pareto frontier.
3. Asymmetric Information and Expectations
Asymmetric information and expectations about future changes in bargaining power can be another reason that states fail to reach agreements
with high exit costs in the face of shifting power.132 As in litigation in
which both parties are optimistic about their chances for success, when both
states are optimistic about their future prospects the space for an agreement
shrinks.133 Consider a case where State A believes that it is going to become
more powerful over time, but State B believes the current configuration of
power is stable. State A will be unwilling to agree to high exit costs and
substantive terms that reflect current bargaining power because it views
such an agreement as giving away its future leverage. For its part, State B
will be unwilling to offer significantly better substantive terms than are
justified by State A’s current bargaining power.
One possibility in such a situation is that the states fail to reach an agreement or that an agreement is delayed. The benefit of delay is that over time
information may be revealed or expectations aligned. By waiting, a potentially ascendant state will have its outside option revealed and, if power has
become more stable, states can then bargain from the same informational
position. But delay is also costly, as it means putting off cooperation until
such time as power configurations (or beliefs about power configurations)
permit an agreement.
Another possibility is that the states will reach an agreement that contains low exit costs and substantive terms that reflect today’s bargaining
power. Such an agreement is value-creating from each state’s perspective.
State A’s future stream of benefits from its ability to renegotiate has not
been significantly reduced by the current agreement. It therefore does not
132. Cf. John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973) (developing the
theory that trials result because of mutual optimism by the parties); Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1974) (same).
133. Id. Interestingly, having two optimistic parties may cause the space for an agreement to shrink
on the substantive terms of an agreement but may also remove exit costs as an issue in the negotiation. If
both parties believe they are becoming more powerful, both sides will prefer low exit costs. Similarly, if
both sides believe they are declining, both sides will prefer high exit costs, again removing exit costs as
an issue.
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view its concession on the substantive rules as particularly costly. State B has
conceded on the issue of exit costs, but does not view this concession as
costly because it does not think State A is likely to get stronger and develop
a credible threat of exit.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that power may be shifting so rapidly as
to preclude agreement altogether (or at least an agreement that has nonzero
exit costs). For example, a declining state may not be able to offer a patient
ascendant state that expects to see the value of its outside option double in
the next period enough to make an agreement worth its while. The value of
the ascendant state’s outside option today plus the present value of its
outside option tomorrow may exceed the gains from cooperation that are left
after the declining state receives the minimum necessary for it to cooperate.
This section has argued that in the presence of shifting power states will
often be forced to concede on either exit costs or the substantive provisions
of an agreement. How states will make that tradeoff is a complicated question. I have argued that variables such as the difference in states’ discount
rates, exogenously determined distributional conflicts, and uncertainty and
asymmetric information determine whether an agreement is reached quickly
and what shape it takes.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The theory of bargaining presented in this Article has major implications
for the ways in which international agreements are negotiated. In this Part I
discuss how my theory helps explain a number of puzzles in international
law.
A. Rogue States and Legalization
One of the central puzzles of international law is why so-called “rogue”
states are willing to sign on to legally binding commitments that they have
little intention of honoring.134 Both statistical and anecdotal studies have
documented this oddity. For example, countries with poor human rights
records ratify human rights treaties at nearly the same rate as those states
with good human rights records,135 and rogue states sign binding arms control agreements that they almost immediately violate.136 The fact that rogue
states with little intention of honoring their commitments at times join
international agreements at the same rate as well-behaved states implicates
134. See Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1844–45 (2003) (discussing the small difference between the rates at which states with good human rights practices and
states with bad human rights practices ratify human rights treaties) [hereinafter Hathaway, Commitment];
Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L. J. 1935, 1940 (2002).
135. Hathaway, Commitment, supra note 134, at 1844–45.
136. See, e.g., Arsalan M. Suleman, Bargaining in the Shadow of Violence: The NPT, IAEA, and Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 206, 231 (2008).

R

\\server05\productn\H\HLI\51-2\HLI202.txt

unknown

Seq: 37

2010 / Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law

2-JUL-10

9:34

415

one of the central debates in international legal circles: whether international law does indeed affect the behavior of states, and by extension, the
value of international law to regulating world order.
Proponents of the view that international law does help order the behavior of states have advanced various theories to explain why states with little
intention of honoring their international commitments would nevertheless
sign up to an agreement that is binding and frequently very difficult to exit.
Where human rights treaties are involved, for example, Hathaway has argued that states will join international agreements that are binding because
the expected domestic costs of compliance and enforcement—the “costs of
commitment”—are low, while the collateral benefits of joining, such as insulation from criticism or eligibility for foreign assistance, are high.137 A
reputational theory of international law suggests a different reason for these
seeming anomalies. A state that already has a poor reputation for compliance
with international law loses little by joining a legally binding agreement
with which it does not intend to comply.138 Such a state’s reputation for
compliance cannot get significantly worse, and so the marginally higher cost
associated with violating or illegally exiting the agreement is unlikely to
deter a state from signing a legally binding commitment.139
Both of these theories leave significant room for further explanation. The
“cost of commitment” theory, for its part, is explicit in identifying only one
set of costs associated with joining an international agreement—the domestic costs of enforcement.140 This theory thus does not delve deeply into other
associated costs, such as reputational costs for noncompliance. And while the
reputational theory does address some of these costs (or the lack thereof)
from the standpoint of the rogue state, it does not explain why states
partnering with the rogue state prefer a legally binding agreement. If a state
with a good reputation for compliance and a state with a bad reputation for
compliance enter into an agreement in which both understand that the
rogue state’s reputation for compliance is already so poor that reputational
sanctions are unlikely to deter illegal exit, one might expect the result to be
a nonbinding agreement. The logic behind this prediction is that in such a
situation the rogue state’s exit may be undeterrable. Raising exit costs is
unlikely to affect the rogue state’s behavior meaningfully. High exit costs
are therefore a net cost to the state with a good reputation; they constrain
the well-behaved state while leaving the rogue state relatively unconstrained
in seeking a renegotiation.
The theory presented in this Article helps further unlock the puzzle of
why rogue states sign binding agreements with which they have little inten137.
CHI. L.
138.
139.
140.

Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U.
REV. 469, 514 (2005).
GUZMAN, supra note 54, at 86.
Id.
Hathaway, Commitment, supra note 134, at 1824.
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tion of complying. The key insight is that states are negotiating two issues—exit costs and substance—and differing discount rates mean that they
value prevailing on the two issues differently. Exit costs are essentially a
forward-looking provision, valuable to a patient state, while substance is
valuable to both states. In short, differential discount rates among ascendant
and declining states can explain high exit costs in situations in which violations may seem largely undeterrable from an ex ante perspective—a situation
left unexplained by current theories.
To illustrate, suppose that an ascendant rogue state retains some minimal
reputational capital, such that signing a binding agreement imposes a cost
on the rogue state should it choose to illegally exit the agreement. An ascendant rogue state, because it substantially discounts the future, is willing to
hobble its ability to renegotiate tomorrow by agreeing to high exit costs
today. Giving away the ability to renegotiate might very well lock in its
ability to obtain a better substantive deal today from the well-behaved nation, something to which it attaches considerably more importance. On the
other hand, the concession on high exit costs still has value to the wellbehaved state, which has a longer time horizon, even if it does not to the
rogue state. The reason is that the constraint on the rogue state is real. In
five years, the rogue state will have to take into account the reputational
sanctions associated with the higher level of exit costs when deciding
whether to threaten to illegally exit the agreement.
Consider in this vein negotiations between North Korea and the United
States over nuclear disarmament. In such negotiations, one might think of
North Korea as the ascendant state. As its nuclear capability becomes more
developed, its bargaining power vis-à-vis the United States and its own
neighbors increases. North Korea, though, arguably has a short time horizon
created by its precarious economic situation.141 North Korea has entered
into agreements with the United States or its surrogates several times in an
effort to exchange its nuclear capability for various forms of basic economic
aid. For example, following the 1994 Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula with the United
States,142 a non-binding document, North Korea signed the so-called “Supply Agreement”143 with the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (“KEDO”), an international organization consisting of the United
141. This example is not meant to suggest that rogue states will necessarily or even usually be ascendant. There is good reason to think that states that highly discount the future are more likely to be
declining states. Because they are not concerned with their future, states that discount the future are
unlikely to invest in developing outside options that will allow them to renegotiate at a later time.
142. Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula, U.S.N. Korea, Oct. 21, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 603 [hereinafter Agreed Framework].
143. Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea Between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, KEDO-N. Korea, Dec. 15, 1995, available at http://www.kedo.
org/pdfs/SupplyAgreement.pdf [hereinafter Supply Agreement].

\\server05\productn\H\HLI\51-2\HLI202.txt

unknown

Seq: 39

2010 / Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law

2-JUL-10

9:34

417

States, South Korea, and Japan.144 In 2002, all three states participating in
KEDO denounced North Korea for violating its arms control agreements,
and KEDO suspended heavy oil shipments to North Korea.145
A reputational theory of international law suggests that North Korea is
willing to enter into binding agreements despite an intention not to fully
comply because it has a poor reputation which it does not value.146 Having
violated so many of its commitments in the past, North Korea lacks the
ability to signal to cooperative partners through the signing of a binding
agreement its intention to comply. This theory does not, however, explain
why the KEDO nations would prefer a binding agreement with North Korea. Not expecting the binding provision to provide a significant deterrent
to violation and illegal exit in either event, it is not clear why the KEDO
nations would not prefer a nonbinding agreement as well. A nonbinding
agreement would allow the KEDO nations to withdraw from the agreement
more easily and save any reputational costs associated with their own possible violations.147 Moreover, even if North Korea does retain some reputational capital, the high likelihood of violation may mean that a legally
binding agreement imposes a net loss on the parties—little of North Korea’s
noncompliant behavior is deterred, and so there is little benefit to the
KEDO nations, but North Korea still suffers a reputational sanction.
The theory of exit costs offered here explains the rationality of a binding
agreement from both the KEDO nations’ and North Korea’s perspectives.
As a state that both has little reputational capital and places little value on
the future, North Korea is perfectly willing to enter a binding agreement in
exchange for immediate economic relief. The KEDO nations, which take a
longer view of events, want a binding agreement because they are looking
ahead to a time when those exit costs may influence North Korean behavior.
B. Weak Agreements as a Prelude to Rigid Agreements
A frequent refrain in the debate about form and substance is that relatively less constraining formal provisions—provisions that are more “flexible” —are used as a precursor to agreements that contain more stringent
formal provisions.148 Scholars have argued that “flexible” agreements are
144. Masahiko Asado, Arms Control Law in Crisis? A Study of the North Korean Nuclear Issue, 9 J.
CONFLICT & SEC. L. 331, 338 (2004).
145. Id. at 340.
146. GUZMAN, supra note 54, at 86.
147. North Korea has accused the United States of violations of the Agreed Framework and the
Supply Agreement by, inter alia, suspending oil shipments under false pretenses. Charles J. Moxley, Jr.,
The Sword in the Mirror—The Lawfulness of North Korea’s Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons Based on
the United States’ Legitimization of Nuclear Weapons, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1379, 1385–86 (2004).
148. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 4, at 446–47; David J. Bederman, Review Essay: Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 469, 484 (2001). These studies often use
slightly different terminology than that used in this paper, referring to agreements that have weak formal
provisions as “soft law” and those with strong formal mechanisms that constrain behavior as “hard law.”
For reasons discussed elsewhere, I consider the distinction between hard and soft law to refer only to the
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used, for example, to allow states to experiment with particular substantive
rules and learn how they operate in practice.149 Similarly, soft law is sometimes seen as a second-best option to hard law, but one that can usher reluctant states from non-cooperation to an eventual hard law agreement.150
Other scholars have countered by pointing out that there are a number of
reasons why relatively more flexible agreements may be first-best, or at least
value-creating.151 Flexibility provided by formal provisions can be crucial to
making an agreement possible because the flexibility reallocates risk. For
example, escape clauses, which allow a state to avoid its substantive obligations under certain circumstances, may promote agreement by providing
insurance to domestic politicians, allowing them to make politically necessary decisions without the fear of violating an international obligation.152
By explicitly considering renegotiation in light of shifting power and its
effect on the initial bargaining over an agreement, the theory presented in
this Article bridges the divide between these two viewpoints. I have argued
that where one state is increasing in power, a declining state will likely have
to make one of two concessions in order to obtain an agreement. On the one
hand, the declining state can make the terms of a deal substantively more
attractive. On the other hand, the declining state can concede lower exit
costs, leaving itself vulnerable to renegotiation but locking in preferred substantive rules for the immediate future. Where an agreement reflects the
latter option, states enter into an agreement with the expectation that it will
be renegotiated over time to reflect changes in power.153
At the same time, if power relationships become more stable over time, it
may be possible during a future renegotiation to modify the formal provisions of an agreement. Weak formal mechanisms can be strengthened as
states come to expect that the present configuration of power is stable.154
Consider the following example. As a result of the fact that one state is
becoming stronger, two states include provisions reducing exit costs in an
agreement they are negotiating. As the ascendant state becomes more powerful, it capitalizes on its ability to threaten exit by demanding that the
substantive rules be renegotiated in its favor. At some point, however, the
decision whether to make an agreement legally binding. See Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15, at 890–91;
see also Raustiala, supra note 5, at 582.
149. See Koremenos, supra note 4, at 292; Setear, supra note 25, at 214.
150. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 4, at 446–47; Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternative
Views of ‘Legalization’: Richer Views of Law and Politics, 55 INT’L ORG. 743, 750–51 (2001).
151. See, e.g., Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1599–1601; Koremenos, supra note 4, at 291;
Raustiala, supra note 5, at 583; Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 307, 311 (2006); Sykes,
supra note 34, at 289.
152. See Sykes, supra note 34, at 279.
153. Alternatively, where the declining state believes that the ascendant state overestimates the
probability that it will develop a credible threat to exit in the future, compromising on exit costs may
make sense because neither side views itself as making a significant concession. The ascendant state has
preserved its future bargaining power and the declining state has obtained its preferred substantive rules
at what it considers to be minimal risk.
154. Cf. Powell, supra note 3, at 127.
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ascendant state may cease getting more powerful (or the declining state may
cease getting weaker). At this point in time, the two states may decide to
amend the formal provisions of the agreement to raise exit costs.
This evolutionary dynamic provides a theoretical justification for believing that weak formal mechanisms will often be a precursor to more stringent
ones. Shifting power causes states to negotiate and renegotiate legal rules
over a number of years. At any one point in time, an agreement with weak
formal provisions may be first-best given the parties’ expectations about the
stability of power relationships. But when the parties believe the underlying
distribution of power is indicative of the distribution of power for the foreseeable future, they can settle on legal rules that can be incorporated into a
more formally stringent agreement.
One might wonder why states would feel the need to raise exit costs if
they expect power to be stable. On this view, once the substantive terms of
an agreement reflect the power balance between the two states, neither state
will be able to do better by exiting in the future. Thus, exit costs are not
necessary to dampen the effects of shifting power. While correct as far as it
goes, there still could be several reasons why states would want to raise exit
costs. First, a doctrinal provision increasing exit costs might also increase
the costs of opportunistic violation. Moving from soft law to hard law has
this dual effect; the increase in the reputational sanction for violative conduct deters both illegal exit as well as illegal violations. Second, states may
be uncertain or have asymmetric beliefs about the likelihood that power is
stable. For example, an ascendant state may have private information that it
is no longer becoming more powerful because, say, its domestic energy production has dropped or leveled off. It thus no longer attaches importance to
low exit costs. The (erstwhile) ascendant state may thus be able to extract a
last round of concessions on the substantive rules by agreeing to higher exit
costs.
The example of the NPT is illustrative. The central substantive provision
of the NPT, which came into force in 1970, is that only five states may
legally possess nuclear weapons—the United States, the Soviet Union (now
Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China.155 As the rule was crafted,
it was an effort to freeze membership in the nuclear club at those states that
already possessed a nuclear capability at the time the agreement came into
effect. Formally, the NPT is a legally binding agreement that contains a
sunset provision. After 25 years, the parties to the agreement had to decide
by a majority vote whether to renew the treaty.156 As others have noted, this
sunset provision reflected the parties’ uncertainty as to what the future held,
especially with respect to how the blanket rules against the expansion of the
155. NPT, supra note 21, art. IX(3). The provision actually provides that a “nuclear-weapon State is
one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to
January 1, 1967.” That definition only captures the five mentioned states.
156. Id. art. X(2).
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nuclear franchise would work over time.157 Moreover, there was a fear in the
1960s that many more states would develop a nuclear capability.158 If that
fear had been realized in spite of the NPT, many non-nuclear weapons states
within the NPT may have sought to amend the NPT or exit completely.
Likewise, states that had developed a nuclear capability between 1970 and
1995 might have sought an amendment allowing them to legally possess
nuclear weapons.
Instead, by 1995 the shifts in power as a result of the expansion of the
nuclear franchise were considerably less drastic than had been feared. Although India, Pakistan, and North Korea all developed a nuclear capability
in the years shortly after the 1995 renewal conference (and Iran may have as
well), by 1995 it appeared relatively certain that nuclear weapons were not
going to become prevalent among states. Indeed, in conjunction with the
NPT’s unilateral right of exit,159 the technological changes since 1995 that
allowed for a “latent” nuclear capability—the industrial and technological
ability to produce a nuclear weapon in a relatively short period of time—
have caused a leveling up in power relationships. States were comfortable
both that they could maintain their latent capabilities under the NPT’s existing rules, and that there was no need to renegotiate the treaty to broaden
membership in the nuclear club. Thus, in 1995 the parties to the NPT
renewed the agreement indefinitely, removing that source of leverage.160
C. Multilateral versus Bilateral
Finally, the tradeoff between exit costs and renegotiation has implications
for the negotiation of bilateral versus multilateral agreements. Bilateral
agreements are the easiest place to see the effect of shifts in power on the
initial design of an agreement. As one state becomes more powerful, the
other state must react. Behaving rationally, both states take this into account at the time of renegotiation and the descending state internalizes the
full costs and benefits of the concessions it makes to the ascendant state.
Of course, even without shifting power, generating agreement in the
multilateral context is already considerably harder than in the bilateral context. For example, Gilligan has demonstrated that where all states must
adopt the same standard in an agreement, there will be a tradeoff between
the breadth of membership and the depth of cooperation.161 The fact that
broad multilaterals often are accompanied by shallower substantive terms
can cause states desiring deeper cooperation to prefer agreements with
157. See Koremenos, supra note 4, at 304–12.
158. Id. at 305.
159. NPT, supra note 21, art. X(1).
160. Koremenos, supra note 4, at 312. The right to unilaterally exit the agreement remains and was
exercised by North Korea in 2003.
161. Michael Gilligan, Is There a Broader-Deeper Tradeoff in International Multilateral Agreements?, 58
INT’L ORG. 459, 461 (2004).
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smaller membership, such as bilateral or regional agreements.162 Generating
a multilateral agreement where the benefit from cooperation is a public
good leads to a familiar free-riding problem, in which each state would prefer to remain outside of the agreement so that it can reap the benefits of
cooperation without paying the associated costs. Finally, in truly multilateral agreements the reciprocal withdrawal of benefits is not an effective sanction.163 Fears about enforceability and compliance can lead otherwise
cooperation-minded states to avoid investing in cooperation.
Shifting power exacerbates these problems. Where renegotiation is purely
distributional, as it is likely to be in the presence of shifting power, retaining the cooperation of an ascendant state in a multilateral agreement is itself
a public goods problem. The ascendant state’s continued membership in the
agreement is a public good because individual states cannot be excluded
from receiving the benefits from the ascendant state’s cooperation. Concessions or side payments designed to satisfy an ascendant state thus suffer from
the very same problem that enforcement actions do: the state making the
concession or side payment cannot capture the full benefit of its actions. The
result is that even where concessions or side payments might be optimal
from the standpoint of global welfare, such concessions or side payments
will be undersupplied.
These difficulties with renegotiation will have ramifications for the initial
design of institutions. As I have argued in this Article, potentially ascendant
states will demand one of two things in exchange for cooperation. They will
either expect more favorable substantive rules than their current bargaining
power would seem to justify, or they will expect low exit costs. As noted
above, however, where an agreement produces a public good, the need for
broad membership will tend to drive the substantive terms toward shallower
cooperation.164 Moreover, certain states may wield effective veto power over
the terms of a multilateral agreement.165 The result is that it may be impossible to provide ascendant states with their preferred substantive rules.
Where the substantive rules necessary to attract an ascendant state would be
blocked by a veto-wielding state, states may have to look to other avenues to
attract the ascendant state.
This yields an empirically testable proposition: in the presence of shifting
power we would expect to see multilateral agreements with lower levels of
exit costs relative to bilateral agreements entered into by some subset of the
parties to the multilateral agreement. The logic of this proposition is
162. See Laurence R. Helfer, Towards a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 971, 975 (2007) (noting that in the area of intellectual property developed nations are moving
increasingly to regional or bilateral agreements that provide greater protections than even the most
protective broad multilateral agreements); Chris Brummer, The Ties That Bind? Regionalism, Commercial
Treaties, and the Future of Global Economic Integration, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1349, 1350 (2007).
163. Guzman & Meyer, International Soft Law, supra note 19, at *22.
164. See Gilligan, supra note 161, at 461.
165. Raustiala, supra note 5, at 598–99.

R
R
R

\\server05\productn\H\HLI\51-2\HLI202.txt

422

unknown

Seq: 44

2-JUL-10

9:34

Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 51

straightforward. The need for broad membership—sometimes termed the
“participation constraint”—in an agreement constrains states’ ability to
vary the substantive terms.166 A substantive rule more favorable to an ascendant state may redistribute the gains from cooperation away from one or
more other states. These states, in turn, might be unwilling to join the
agreement as a result of the redistribution. Where these states are necessary
to the success of the agreement—as in the public goods context—the participation constraint will rule out making substantive rules more favorable to
the ascendant state. Thus, attracting the ascendant states to the agreement
will mean agreeing to reduce the level of exit costs.
Moreover, this same logic also suggests that ascendant states should actually exit multilateral agreements more frequently than bilateral agreements.
The reason for this further prediction is two-fold. First, and unremarkably,
we would expect exit rates to be higher in agreements with lower exit costs,
all else equal. Thus, a prediction that exit costs will be lower leads directly
to a prediction that observed exits should be higher. Second, in this situation, renegotiation of an agreement’s substantive terms is likely to fail for
the same reasons that the initial negotiation could not result in substantive
rules favorable to the ascendant state. The participation constraint may dictate allowing a single ascendant state to exit, rather than change the substantive rules that ensured broad membership in the first place.167
The example of climate change negotiations is instructive. Climate
change negotiations have just recently completed their third major iteration.
The first was the 1992 UNFCCC; the second was the Kyoto Protocol to the
UNFCCC; and the third was the Copenhagen negotiations in December
2009. One of the central issues in these negotiations has been the extent to
which groups of states would accept legally binding emissions targets. Making emissions targets nonbinding, of course, is one way to reduce the sanctions both for not meeting the targets and for de facto exiting from the
targets.
One way to operationalize bargaining power in the climate change area is
through relative emissions levels. Because climate change is a public bad,
states or groups of states that produce a significant percentage of the world’s
emissions may be necessary members of a regime in order for the regime to
be effective. It follows that as a state or group of states produces more emissions, it will be able to demand more concessions in exchange for its participation in a climate change regime. Moreover, developing nations in
particular have much to lose, in terms of the ability to industrialize their
economies, by agreeing to binding emissions caps. Developing states there166. See BARRETT, supra note 47, at 201–05.
167. A third possibility, of course, is that the presence of shifting power will make it impossible to
satisfy the participation constraint at the outset. In such situations, we would not necessarily observe
either lower exit costs in multilateral agreements or higher rates of exit. Instead, states would simply not
enter into agreements in situations in which exit costs would otherwise have to be low.
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fore have a two-fold interest in resisting climate change negotiations. The
first, which has been recognized throughout the climate change negotiations, is that emissions caps could harm their economic prospects.168 But the
second is that developing states might reasonably expect to be able to negotiate a better climate change agreement at a time when they are having a
more negative impact on climate change.
The table below illustrates changes in relative emissions levels starting in
1990.169 The trend is clear, with developing nations India and China soon
expected to produce roughly one-third of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions,170 while developed nations such as the United States and European
countries expect to see their share of emissions fall from nearly forty-five
percent to less than thirty percent by 2030. One can also see that from 1990
onward the United States is becoming more “powerful” relative to European
nations, as its share of global emissions falls slower than Europe’s does.
TABLE 1: RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ANNUAL CARBON DIOXIDE
EMISSIONS BY COUNTRY/REGION (APPROXIMATE PERCENT OF
WORLDWIDE EMISSIONS)171
1990
United States
OECD Europe
China
India
Japan
Africa

2003

2004

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

23.5% 22.7% 22.0% 20.1% 19.4% 18.8% 18.7% 18.5%
19.3% 16.9% 16.3% 14.6% 13.4% 12.4% 11.6% 10.9%
10.5% 15.3% 17.5% 21.1% 22.4% 23.9% 25.0% 26.2%
2.7% 4.1% 4.1% 4.2% 4.4% 4.7% 4.9% 5.0%
4.8% 4.9% 4.7% 4.1% 3.8% 3.5% 3.3% 3.0%
3.1% 3.5% 3.4% 3.7% 3.8% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9%

The bargaining over the form and substance of emissions targets illustrates the prediction that in the presence of shifting power, multilateral
agreements are likely to have low exit costs. The UNFCCC, for its part,
contained only a nonbinding target that states stabilize their emissions at
1990 levels by the year 2000.172 As the theory put forth in this Article
suggests, the United States made substantial concessions on substantive
points to ensure that the targets would be non-binding.173 In the Kyoto
168. Charlotte Booncharoen & John Gase, International Commitment Toward Curbing Global Warming, 4
ENVTL. L. 917, 932 (1998).
169. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per Capita
Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51, 61 (2009) (quoting International Energy Agency statistics from 2006).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4.2, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. Although the UNFCCC is itself a binding agreement, the emissions reductions obligations are specifically couched in nonbinding terminology.
173. First, the United States did agree to a specific reduction target and timetable: stabilizing output
at 1990 levels by the year 2000. The UNFCCC is thus not a case in which the obligation reached was
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Protocol, the tradeoff was made in the opposite direction. The United States
agreed to binding targets, but extracted significant concessions on the substance of the emissions control regime established by the Kyoto Protocol.174
But the United States failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and thus ultimately
failed to agree to binding targets. Moreover, in neither agreement did developing nations—the fastest-growing producers of greenhouse gas emissions
and thus ascendant states in this Article’s terminology—accept any binding
obligations to reduce emissions, despite the United States’ insistence that
they do so.175
Fortunately, if the chart above reflects an accurate estimate of how states’
greenhouse gas emissions will be allocated in the future, the prospects for an
agreement in the next several years may be brighter. The chart indicates that
while major changes in the allocation of emissions occurred or are expected
couched purely in terms of principles, although the UNFCCC does contain quite a bit of language
calling on signatories to abide by various principles. Second, the United States dropped its resistance to
providing financial support to developing countries. The text of the UNFCCC creates a legal obligation
for developed states to provide financial aid to developing nations, and outside of the UNFCCC, the
United States committed to a seventy-five-million-dollar figure. Finally, developing nations made no
specific commitments—binding or otherwise—with respect to emissions targets. The United States had
strongly favored some commitment from developing states. Shardul Agrawala & Steinar Andresen, Indispensability and Indefensibility? The United States in the Climate Treaty Negotiations, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
457, 461–62, 465 (1999).
174. The Kyoto Protocol included specific targets for Annex I countries, including, for the United
States, a seven percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2008–2012. These
targets reflected a twin American victory. First, the time period agreed upon reflected exactly the American proposal, designed to ameliorate the effects of short-term fluctuations in economic or weather conditions that might affect a state’s ability to meet a specific deadline. Second, the target itself reflects
agreement on a standard very close to the American standard. Agrawala & Andresen, supra note 173, at
465. Perhaps the greatest success for the United States, however, came in the form of the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions trading rules. A major emissions trading program was the chief concession that the
United States demanded in exchange for accepting binding emissions targets. David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun Wedding: Emissions Trading under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND.
L.J. 21, 34–35 (2008); James H. Searles, Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 21 INT’L ENV’T REP. 131, 133 (Feb. 4, 1998). The Kyoto Protocol involves three distinct
emissions trading programs. Under Article 16, developed countries may trade their national allowances
at the state-to-state level. Moreover, Article 6 allows the parties, or private actors within the stateparties, to buy and sell emissions reductions units created by projects within a country (this method of
emissions trading is known as “joint implementation”). For example, a private firm that creates a carbon
sink may essentially sell the resulting emissions reductions to a firm in a different country, with the
latter country receiving credit for the reduction. A similar mechanism, known as the Clean Development
Mechanism (“CDM”), is established by Article 12. Under CDM, developed countries or private firms
within developed countries can purchase certified emissions reductions from firms in developing countries, despite the fact that developing countries have no emissions reductions obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol. Thus, under the agreement, states can trade their legally allotted allowances with one another,
and they can also invest in reductions in other countries, both developed and undeveloped. Collectively,
these measures are known as the Kyoto Protocol’s “flexibility mechanisms.” Driesen, supra, at 34–35.
175. A continuous sticking point for the United States during climate change negotiations, that in
part led to its failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, has been the inclusion of binding targets for developing as well as developed nations. In 1997, by a vote of ninety-five to zero, the Senate passed the ByrdHagel Resolution, which provided in relevant part that the United States should not agree to any binding emissions targets “unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties.” S. Res. 98,
105th Cong. (1997) (enacted).
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to occur between 1990 and 2010 or 2015, after 2015 the rate of change is
expected to slow considerably. If states expect emissions levels to stabilize in
coming years, then the prospect of future renegotiations may be sufficiently
reduced such that states are able to get an agreement that places meaningful
emissions limits—with high exit costs—on all relevant states.
V. CONCLUSION
Existing theories of the design of international agreements do not account
for the fact that states’ bargaining power changes over time. However,
power is constantly shifting between states, often in dramatic ways. These
shifts in power affect the design of international agreements. States take into
account their expectations about future power, and if a state expects to be
stronger tomorrow, then agreeing to constrain its future behavior represents
an opportunity cost for which it should expect to be compensated. For a
variety of reasons, including uncertainty, the extent to which states discount
the future, and commitment problems, states may not wish or be able to
reach an agreement that is renegotiation-proof. States thus must decide how
to trade off the substance of an agreement (the distribution of benefits)
against the level of exit costs. They must determine, in effect, how much to
take their future interactions out of the realm of politics and put them into
the realm of law. Understanding how states make this tradeoff—how they
cope with their shifting prospects for the future—can help us unlock ways
to generate value-creating agreements in crucial areas of international
cooperation.
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